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IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

VALUES
IMMEDIATE AND CONTRIBUTORY
AND THEIR INTERRELATION

VALUES
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CONTRIBUTORY
AND THEIR INTERRELATION

By
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PREFACE

IT would seem that an apology is due from me to Professor W. M. Urban for not having discussed his significant contribution to value-philosophy, entitled, *Valuation, Its Nature and Laws*. My omission is not due to any failure to recognize that Professor Urban is, in this country, the most eminent representative of a large school of value-philosophers, among whom are A. Meinong, C. V. Ehrenfels, and G. Simmel. My reason for not discussing their views in the present work is similar to that which prompted me to pass by Münsterberg's *The Eternal Values*. Here are two schools of value-philosophy with presuppositions radically different from my own. That school which Professor Urban so well represents finds the *locus* of value in the "worth-fundamental," discovered by an analysis of mental life. Münsterberg finds value in the region of the human will, and he believes that value implies an over-personal, metaphysically absolute will. Both find value primarily to be a *quality* which colors certain mental states — Münsterberg believes that it points toward an objective "Overself."

In contrast to this subjective point of de-

parture, I have treated value as *relational*, occurring in definite situations. I have used the psychological basis of values not as the sum and substance of valuation, but as a description of one term of value-relations, the other term, that of the environment, calling for equal attention. Thus I have been able to avoid the acrostic philosophy of the value-psychologists, which tends in the direction of epistemological realism, and the lack of concreteness incidental to it. I may note, however, that Professor Urban considers briefly, in the last chapter of his book, some of the problems which I discuss in detail.

To Professor Herman Harrell Horne of New York University, I am indebted for numerous suggestions and for a final reading of the proof; and to Professor Arthur Huntington Nason, Director of the New York University Press, for critical oversight of publication. Above all, however, my gratitude is due to Professor Dickinson S. Miller of General Theological Seminary, for his kindness in reading my manuscript and making many helpful suggestions as to the method of treatment of my subject.

M. P.

New York City,
January 31, 1920.

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VALUES
IMMEDIATE AND CONTRIBUTORY
AND THEIR INTERRELATION

INTRODUCTION

IN this thesis, I purpose taking as my starting point the general agreement among writers as to the existence of values belonging to two distinct classes, immediate and contributory. In order to put the distinction between the two classes beyond question, I shall limit the class "immediate" to those immediate values which are agreed to be subjective, i.e., dependent for their existence upon some particular individual who holds them as values. The propositions, therefore, which I shall assume to be matters of general agreement are, "There is a class of values which may be named 'contributory'." "All contributory values are objective." "There is another class of values which may be termed 'immediate'." "Some immediate values are subjective."

Having distinguished two classes of values as subject-matter for discussion, I proceed to treat of their interrelations. But, before this can be done effectually, it is found to be necessary to disprove a theory which, if true, would render the distinction between immediate and

contributory values of slight importance. It has been held that the values known as contributory are dependent for their validity upon certain *a priori* immediate values because all truth is said to rest upon immediate recognition of its presence. I therefore devote a chapter to disproving this theory.

With two classes of values of unquestioned distinction, I next discuss their interrelation with reference to their origin, with reference to knowledge, and with reference to their co-existence.

Part II examines immediate values with a view to demonstrating that there are no objective immediate values. This result confirms the validity of the initial distinction between objective-contributory and subjective-immediate values, and carries the proposition "Some immediate values are subjective" to the wider application of the proposition "It cannot be proved that there are *any* immediate values which are not subjective."

PART I
THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES

CHAPTER I

TWO CLASSES OF VALUES

THE method to be pursued, as stated in the introduction, is to begin the discussion by finding some point of agreement among writers on value. It is not to be expected that there may be discovered groups of values to whose clear cut distinctions all writers will subscribe. It is not unlikely, however, that there may exist a fundamental distinction in kind between certain values and certain other values, and that the points at issue may be due to differences of opinion as to the correct assignment of other particular values. First, I shall point out two radically different types of value; secondly, I shall indicate the nature of those values which may not be assigned summarily to one of the two classes.

§ 1. The distinction which I have in mind is between contributory or instrumental values and immediate values. The adjectives “instrumental” and “immediate” indicate that the distinction is a logical one, distinguishing values as given goods or as means. Contributory

values are not self-sufficient; they look beyond themselves to some end-in-view. They comprise objects that are “good *for*” something, or acts that conduce to the attainment of some specific end. Thus, this pen is good for writing; apples are good for food. I visit my physician in order to obtain treatment from him; he prescribes for me in order that I may get well. Pen, apples, and the acts of visiting and treatment are of contributory value.

Immediate values, on the other hand, are “non-mediate.” They do not look forward to an end, but are intrinsic, self-sufficient. They are ends-in-themselves in the sense that they are simply given as good when stated, requiring neither reference to any object or act beyond themselves, nor verification of any kind. Of such character are objects and acts which I like, demand, admire, approve, wish, want, etc. I admire a beautiful vase; it thus becomes of value to me, irrespective of any other vases that I admire. I disapprove of the act of taking human life; the act of killing thereby becomes of negative value to me. Sailing and smoking are valuable to me.

§ 2. The fundamental character of the dis-

inction between immediate and contributory values will appear when their psychological basis is taken into account. Observe first that objects and acts of contributory value demand for their existence other objects or acts to which they may be related. They cannot stand alone. For a government note to be of the value of ten dollars, the ten dollars must actually exist somewhere. Apples, considered as good for food, imply the existence of some suitable digestive apparatus. If my visit to my physician is to be valuable as a means to getting well, I must now be capable of improvement in health beyond my present state. Now, as both contributory and instrumental values are here spoken of with reference to man, it is obvious that the psychological basis of contributory values must be sought in some aspect of the human mind by which objects and acts may be related to other objects and acts. Cognition alone satisfies this requirement. We may say, therefore, that contributory values are closely associated with the cognitive aspect of consciousness, where comparison, memory, and reasoning furnish a mechanism for relating portions of our experience.

Immediate values, on the other hand, do not require relation of two ideas in consciousness. They are simple, unique, self-sufficing facts. They are matters of taste, and “*de gustibus non disputandum.*” What is the importance of the cognitive aspect of conscious activity with respect to such values? Must I *know* them in order to *have* them? Not any more than that the leopard must know that he has spots in order to have them. Knowledge of values, therefore, is quite distinct from values themselves, and we shall do well always to bear this fact in mind.

If cognition is merely incidental to immediate values, the psychological basis of immediate values must be sought in some aspect of consciousness other than the cognitive aspect. There remain, in the popular division, the fields of will and feeling. The words “like,” “demand,” “want,” “admire,” “approve,” “wish,” etc., which describe the type of relation that exists between the individual and the objects or acts which he immediately values, are all expressive of *feeling*. It is also noteworthy that, if the feeling is toward an object or act which the individual is not possessing or doing at the

time, there is also frequently present an *impulse* to gain possession of the object or to do the act. If I am sufficiently eager to sail, I am impelled to go down to the lake to get the boat ready. If my liking for peanuts affects me deeply, I am likely to go out and buy some. It appears, therefore, that immediate values are also closely associated with the will-aspect of consciousness, and this can be said without committing oneself to any particular theory as to the *nature* of that will-aspect. In the case of contributory values, however, there is a hypothetical characteristic which makes their relation to will quite different. Apples are good for food *if* I am hungry. My pen is good for writing *when* I want to write. In these examples, there is no impulse aroused by the act of contributory valuation; I may put the object or the act valued to service whenever a suitable occasion is presented, but the object or act will not itself create the occasion. I may conclude, therefore, that will and feeling are peculiarly associated with immediate values, and cognition with contributory values.

§ 3. I must not leave this preliminary consideration of the psychological basis of value without a caution and a deduction. The cau-

tion is that the assignment of two classes of values to different fields of psychological manifestation must not be held to imply that the individual ever acts *exclusively* in any one "field" of consciousness. Cognition, feeling, and will are aspects of a conscious activity which is undivided. The distinction with reference to value is one of emphasis rather than one of division. More than that, the distinction implies that we human beings, in our discussion and discrimination of values, recognize that we value things in different ways, according as we think, feel, or do them. But this is not to deny the presence of a minimum of feeling and impulse necessary to the presence of a thought. There are all gradations of emphasis of cognition, feeling, and will in conscious activity, and it is not unlikely that we may find situations of conscious activity in which both classes of value are simultaneously present. The interrelation of the two classes is, in fact, a subject of future discussion in this thesis. At this juncture, it is necessary only to point out that I do not mean to *isolate* any "field" of consciousness in the act, but only to emphasize that the two classes of value *refer* exclusively to different aspects of conscious activity.

The deduction which I wish to make is that contributory values have a measure of independence of any one individual, which immediate values cannot claim. Two facts make this evident: (*a*) The cognitive function by its process of comparison and relation of ideas one to another makes contributory values independent of a particular time or moment in the activity of the individual. If my umbrella is good for keeping off the rain, it is good for that purpose when next it rains, be it today, next Wednesday, or next month. I may *verify* contributory values. I may find out what my umbrella is good for. (*b*) The cognitive function has developed the convenient method of expression of ideas of one individual to another by means of speech. It is conceivable that I might demonstrate the use of my umbrella to a soaked friend by gestures, but words greatly facilitate the process. In this way, contributory values are made independent not only of any special moment in the life of an individual, but also of any particular individual. This is in marked contrast with immediate values: the communication of my likes and dislikes to my neighbor is a matter of some difficulty, and sympathetic

feeling always lacks something of the flavor of the original experience.

§ 4. With some care, the terms "objective" and "subjective" may be used to signify the distinction between immediate and contributory values. The independence which has just been recognized as characteristic of contributory values makes "objective" an appropriate designation for them. If such values pass as coin among the members of a community, they must cling to the object rather than to the persons who employ them. This is not to say, however, that they would be values at all apart from the relation of the objects to individuals who value them, but they may be called "objective" in deference to the fact that they do not depend for their existence upon any *particular* member of a community.

§ 5. The term "subjective," in contrast, is applicable to at least some immediate values, in view of the fact that they cannot exist apart from the conscious activity of some particular individual.

§ 6. The second task which I set for myself at the beginning of the chapter was that of indicating certain classes of values over whose

position there is some dispute. The current differences of opinion are nearly all due to one fact, namely, that it is possible to use the cognitive function of conscious activity to express in thought and language facts of immediate value.

As we have seen, it is necessary that there be a cognitive minimum in order to be conscious of an immediate value. This element, however, at first at a minimum, may grow to the very limit of cognitive development and attain expression in the judgment. If apples are of immediate value, I may think of them as such, and I may make the judgment, "I like apples." Some writers now argue thus: "I like apples" is a judgment. Judgments are capable of verification. But immediate values do not demand verification. Therefore judgments of immediate values are immediately true. It is further argued that truth, not only of value-judgments but also *all* truth, is of immediate value, because, it is claimed, in judgment there is always an element of approval or disapproval on the part of the judging individual. Clearly, therefore, truth is a value whose assignment is in dispute, if, indeed, it be a value at all.

Again, in the judgment "I admire the vase," there is expressed a fact of immediate value. Suppose that, in my admiration, I pronounce it beautiful. Is the beauty a quality of the vase, or only my feeling toward it? If the beauty is in the vase, there must be some standard of beauty outside my consciousness, and the immediate value of appreciation of the beautiful will not be subjective, but objective. The place of aesthetic values, therefore, is in dispute.

Again, in judging an action to be good, am I expressing only my feeling toward it, or is my feeling governed by the presence of an objective standard of moral value which I instinctively recognize? Is it true that there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so? Or is there a moral standard, quite independent of my sentiments, which is valid for all time? The place of moral values, therefore, is in dispute.

§ 7. To discuss these disputed points will be a part of what follows. At this point, however, it is suitable to distinguish carefully between a *fact* of immediate value, and the *expression* of that same fact in a judgment about immediate value. My feeling toward the vase is quite a distinct and separate thing from the judgment

"The vase is beautiful." The one does not necessitate the other. I might like the vase, and never put my liking into words; or I might say, "The vase, no doubt, is beautiful, but I feel no liking for it." Judgments of immediate values, therefore, do not derive immediacy from the immediate values which they state. The psychological basis outlined earlier in the chapter must be preserved. Judgments, even judgments of immediate value, since they fall within the field of cognition, must be classed with contributory values, if they are values at all. And strange as it may appear, the judgment that a vase is immediately beautiful will be found to be of contributory value.¹

Discussion of the possible existence of objective moral and aesthetic standards may be postponed to a later chapter. But discussion of the status of *truth* may not be postponed, because, if truth should be found to be immediate and antecedent to judgment, the distinction between immediate and contributory values would be of slight consequence. There would then be too little separation between certain values with reference to the cognitive function

¹ Cf. page 58.

and certain other values with reference to the feeling-function of conscious activity to make the distinction worth while. My next task, therefore, is that of discussing the place of truth in a classification of values.

The substance of this chapter may be summarized as follows:

§ 1. It is generally agreed that there are two groups of values which are distinct and separate and which may be named immediate and contributory values.

The distinction is a logical one: contributory values are means to ends; immediate values are given as good.

§ 2. The psychological basis of contributory values is the cognitive aspect of conscious activity; that of immediate values is the feeling-aspect, often joined with the will-aspect.

§ 3. It is not implied that any aspect of consciousness functions without the presence of the other aspects.

§ 4. "Objective" applied to contributory values means that they do not depend for their existence upon a *particular* individual. "Subjective" applied to immediate values means

that they do depend for their existence upon some particular individual.

§ 5. It is generally agreed that contributory values are objective in this sense; and that some immediate values are subjective.

§ 6. Whether there are objective immediate values, in the realms of truth, beauty, and morality, is a disputed question.

§ 7. Confusion between the classes of contributory and immediate values has been due largely to the fact that it is possible to make judgments as to immediate values.

CHAPTER II

TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE

A CHIEF distinction between immediate and contributory values is that the latter admit of verification, while the former do not. If a friend tells me that a certain brand of soap is good for taking off dirt, I can very quickly find out for myself whether what he says is true or not. I can discover whether soap is contributory to the end of cleansing. But if my friend tells me that he likes a perfume, I cannot verify the immediate value of his liking. He simply likes it, and it is valuable to him without any ado. Whether I find it agreeable, or what his other friends think about it, makes no difference; for him, it is of immediate value.

Certain writers, however, tell us that the verification of the soap as contributory to cleansing is not merely a matter of using it and watching its effect upon the skin. They say that the process of trial and observation is of secondary importance beside *recognition* of the truth that soap cleanses. And this recognition, they say,

has nothing to do with verification, but is based on a powerful compulsion of the feeling-side of consciousness to assent to it as true. Truth, they say, *is* thus an immediate value.

Now if truth be an immediate value, all those values which I designated as contributory are, in the last analysis, immediate, or, at least, based on immediate values. My whole thesis, on the other hand, assumes that there are the two classes of values, immediate and contributory, and that they are coordinate in rank. It becomes of first importance, therefore, to disprove the theory that truth is an immediate value.

A very subtle psychological argument has been advanced to prove this theory. The keenest piece of analysis in its support has been made by H. Rickert in his *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*.¹ It will be profitable to summarize and criticize Rickert's position.

Starting with the classic conception of truth as located in the judgment,² Rickert emphasizes the practical character of knowledge. He observes that there is no truth where there is only a succession of perceptions, and that the fully

¹ Rickert, H., *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, Tübingen und Leipzig, 2 Aufl., 1904.

² *Op. cit.*, 84 ff.

developed logical judgment appears only when the individual takes an interest (*Anteil*) in the perceptions. He says that affirmation or negation is logically implied in all judgments which are held to contain knowledge in the sense of true knowledge. Thus, knowing is appreciating (*Kennen ist Erkennen*). But appreciation has to do only with values; therefore truth is a value. The value truth is coordinate with values derived from willing and feeling; that is, truth is an immediate value. The usual opposition made between perceptions and judgments, on the one hand, and feeling and willing, on the other, is false; the true opposition is between perceiving, on the one hand, and judgments of affirmation and negation together with feeling and willing, on the other. Affirmation and negation, since they are expressive of interest, are a kind of approval or disapproval, pleasure or displeasure. Knowing is a process determined through the feelings. But truth differs from the appreciation that comes with feelings other than affirmation or negation, in that the appreciation that comes with chance feelings (i.e., immediate values) is unstable, whereas the feeling that appreciates truth is timeless.

A necessity of judgment is here felt, different from the necessity of perceiving (causal necessity). Necessity of judgment is logical necessity, *Sollen*, in contradistinction to *Müssen*. *Sollen* precedes *Sein* in existential judgments, because *Sein* is only expressible by a judgment.

Now if this doctrine is sound, it is obvious that any separation of two classes of values, one of which excludes the element of judgment, is vitiated. For Rickert makes the true judgment dependent upon a necessary feeling of appreciation; that is, he makes of it an immediate value. According to his theory, the truth of my judgment "The tree is green" is grounded in a transcendental *Sollen* which compels me to judge it as green, if I judge at all. There is an immediate feeling of affirmation, appreciation, recognition, which requires me to say "green" rather than blue or red. Every fact implies a judgment.³ In the preceding chapter,⁴ I made the distinction between facts of immediate value and judgment concerning the truth or falsity of these facts. According to Rickert, I must have fallen into that "*Positivismus, der die 'Tatsache' und ihre Konstatierung für das*

³ *Op. cit.*, 130.

⁴ Page 16.

einzig und letzte ansieht, was den Philosophen kümmert."⁵ It is necessary, therefore, at this point to criticize Rickert's position:

§ 1. The doctrine that *Sein* depends upon a transcendental *Sollen*, is equivalent to saying that metaphysics is dependent upon epistemology, and many are the objections against such a position.⁶ Here it may be remarked that Rickert, as all others who adopt that standpoint, does not live up to his doctrine. If it be true, as he states on p. 130, that existential facts imply a prior judgment, correct method would demand the proof of his theory on the basis of necessary judgments. Such a theory must not be constructed from any materials outside the sphere of judgments recognized (appreciated) as true. What apparently contradicts such a requirement is to be found on pp. 88-89. In these pages, Rickert distinguishes between the *quaestio facti* of psychology and the *quaestio juris* of epistemology. He says that psychology is concerned with *Sein*, but he adds, "*Sieht man die Feststellung solcher Tatsachen als Aufgabe der Psychologie an, so muss auch die*

⁵ Rickert, *op. cit.*, 130.

⁶ Cf. Marvin, W. T., *The New Realism*, 43-95.

Behandlung der Frage nach dem erkenntnistheoretischen Wesen des Urteils mit psychologischen Feststellungen beginnen, um dann zu sehen, welchen Dienst sie für das Verständnis des logischen Urteilsbegriffes leisten können."

This is to say, you must start with certain existential facts in order to obtain a basis for consideration of the judgment. Later,⁷ he says that it is immaterial whether all judgments, psychologically speaking, contain either an affirmation or a negation, for the epistemological problem concerns only those which do imply one. His developed theory, however, claims that all knowledge (true knowledge — even existential facts) contains an affirmation or a negation. What of the facts taken from psychology which he used to erect his theory? He has assumed the knowledge of certain facts in order to prove a theory of the dependence of reality on knowledge. It is an error of method.

§ 2. The position of Rickert, in holding that existential facts imply judgments, is to the effect that there are immediate truths. We know existential truth with existence, and the latter cannot be regarded as independent of the for-

⁷ Rickert, *op. cit.*, 96.

mer. Rickert is not alone in supposing that there are immediate truths. This theory is held by Russell⁸ and by James, among moderns. In the case of James, however, perhaps it is more a question of terminology, as knowledge, in his use of the word, is not restricted to propositions.

Dewey (in a conversation with the writer) has brought a cogent argument in criticism of this doctrine of immediate truths. In the proposition "It is green," a whole background of experience is presupposed, the comparison of colors. If the judgment is to be verified, the use of spectrum analysis will be required. The truth of the simplest "atomic" proposition, therefore, is dependent upon a great number of "molecular" propositions. "It is green" may be a "snap judgment," associating a particular phenomenon with others that I have experienced, or it may involve the services of an expert physicist, as in a law court. In either case, truth is a matter of inference, and the process is no simple, compelling affirmation, but a harmonization with past experience by comparison.

§ 3. If, therefore, truth always involves some kind of inference, there can be no such thing as

⁸ Cf. Russell, Bertrand, *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, 52 ff.

an "immediate truth." But what shall we say of the affirmation or negation which we are "compelled" to give to existential judgments? It seems to me that Rickert has been misled by his polemic against the object of knowledge conceived as "independent" of the individual. He feels that, if this conception is abandoned, a substitute must be found, not so crude, but still independent. Thereupon he infers an independent *Sollen* from our feeling of necessity in affirming existential judgments. My criticism here is that the question of what is the object of knowledge need not be introduced to account for the affirmation or negation that we feel compelled to make. We need postulate only a center of experience, a succession of phenomena, memory, and association. Affirmation or negation will then be accounted for on the basis of agreement or disagreement of the phenomena by comparison in memory. Truth will then be applicable to those judgments which state relations that have proved constant. From the epistemological standpoint, it is wholly naive to seek an object that compels us to recognize similarity.

§ 4. Perhaps it may be urged that, in the

preceding section, *terms* have been assumed wrongfully to be given before relations, and that we have no right to use terms to explain the judgment, inasmuch as terms themselves imply existential judgments. My answer to this objection is: How then does Rickert feel justified in speaking of an opposition between perceiving (*Vorstellen*) and a class comprised of judgments of affirmation and negation, *Fühlen*, and *Wollen*? What are perceptions if not terms? And, if they are existential judgments, how may they be *opposed* to judgments? And how can Rickert say that, when there is only a succession of perceptions, truth cannot enter?

My conclusion is that affirmation or negation must not be held to be of more than incidental importance where the truth of judgments is concerned, and that its psychological explanation is ultimate.

§ 5. Rickert's correlation of *Bejahen oder Verneinen* with *Billigen oder Missbilligen* and *Gefallen oder Missfallen* is crude and superficial. Because there is an "either-or" in the case of *Fühlen* and *Wollen* which distinguishes positive and negative immediate values, he concludes, without justification, that the "either-

or " of affirmation or negation in *Denken* is similar in kind. It is undeniably true that, when we affirm or deny a proposition, the elements of will and feeling are present in the *act* of affirming or denying. This is to say no more than that the fields of cognition, feeling, and activity are never isolated. It is quite another matter, however, to conclude that feelings determine knowledge.⁹ The true correlation is, that, in connection with judgments and feelings and desires, there is a removal of some kind of opposition; but this is not to say that the determining factor is *one* of the elements, any more than another. It would be just as warrantable to say that *cognition* determines all feelings or all desires. No, there is opposition that is removed in *Fühlen*, *Denken*, and *Wollen*, but the same factor does not operate in each of the three classes. One would have expected that Rickert would have hesitated to make *Fühlen* responsible for *Erkennen*, in view of his recognition of the *timeless*¹⁰ character of the "either-or" of affirmation and negation. It would seem that this timeless character should have made it evident to him that the

⁹ Rickert, *op. cit.*, 106.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 112.

factor of *interest* ¹¹ on the part of the individual is entirely incidental to the truth or falsity of judgments. It is psychological, not logical.

To summarize the arguments, it may be said that truth is not an immediate value because:

§ 1. The theory rests on a false derivation of metaphysics from epistemology;

§ 2. Truth, even existential truth, is inferential;

§ 3. A transcendental *Sollen* is superfluous, and unwarranted by the "feeling of the necessity of judgment";

§ 4. The theory does not account for the existence of perceptions apart from judgment, though it presupposes them;

§ 5. The theory of the dependence of truth on the interest of individuals is logically unsound.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 105.

CHAPTER III

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR ORIGIN

NOW that it has been demonstrated that truth is not an immediate value, the way is cleared for discussion of the interrelations of the two classes of values. I purpose following an order which might be called the "natural history of values." I shall endeavor successively to answer the questions, "Where do values begin in the development of conscious life?" "What is their progress in the course of evolution?" "What happens when we talk about them?" and "How are the two classes related in our daily experience?" The first part of my discussion, therefore, will be biological and psychological, the second, epistemological, and the third, biological and psychological.

Before proceeding with the first part of my task, it will be necessary to describe the standpoint from which discussion of the origin of values is possible. Then I shall describe a series of steps in the development of contributory and immediate values from the earliest

stages of conscious activity to the mature, reflective consciousness of the educated man.

§ 1. It was stated in the first chapter¹ that knowledge of an immediate value is not necessary to its existence. This thesis bears two interpretations, both of which are true and applicable. It may mean: When I like a thing, I don't have to think or speak of it as a value. It may also mean: The feeling I have toward an object that I like is quite distinct from my *knowledge* of that feeling. Now these two interpretations of the independence of immediate value of knowledge thus express the truths that (a) the immediate value is independent of the judgment, and (b) the immediate value is independent of *its being thought*. More explicitly, the latter proposition means that my actual liking for grapes is different in kind from my thought about that actual liking.

We may also argue that contributory values may exist apart from the judgment. Objects may be valued as *means* without judging them to be such. A man may *find* a branch useful for raising a stone. We may suppose him to be so accustomed to raising stones with branches

¹ Page 10.

that he gives no thought to the means which he employs. He simply picks up a stick and uses it as a lever. Such actions, in which we utilize past experience habitually without the medium of judgment, are of every-day occurrence. We may even use means instinctively, without ever having made judgment. The baby who searches for its mother's breast with hands and mouth is employing the latter as means without understanding them to be such. Birds search instinctively for materials out of which to build their nests. The judgment evidently represents a very high level in the development of contributory values.

§ 2. In seeking for a standpoint from which to discuss the origin and development of values, it is evident that we must go back of the judgment. It is evident that values of both classes may be present in consciousness without the presence of judgment. There is a difficulty, however, that confronts us when we come to discuss the development of values from the earliest stage of consciousness. It is not an epistemological difficulty, but rather a difficulty of *standpoint*.

In discussing value, it is quite possible to

confine oneself to the standpoint of the one who values. We may consider how much a man likes or dislikes something, or the value which he places on certain things, or the usefulness of certain articles to him in accomplishing what he aims to accomplish.

On the other hand, it is quite possible to take the standpoint of the spectator or observer, from the vantage-ground of the high plane of judgment. Then we may point out that certain things or actions were valuable to the man, were to his advantage. He may quite accidentally have engaged room and board at a house where one who was to become his lifelong friend was staying. We may say that his coming to that house was a valuable action on his part, in view of the good fortune that came to him later from the friendship. We may say that the value which contributed most to Henry's success was his up-bringing in a home of culture. In these cases, the values of which we speak are means to definite ends, but they are means to ends of which the observer, not the agent, is thinking. From the standpoint of the agent, they are simply *causes* leading to effects. This is indeed the difference between a con-

tributory value and a cause: to be of contributory value, the element of interest must be added. And this interest may be that of the agent or of the spectator.

If it appear that the distinction just drawn is confined to contributory value, observe also that immediate value was seen to be independent of its being thought.² I very much doubt whether any one will claim that the feelings of a man when he was a baby and could not understand them, were more than mechanical. One would hardly say that they were the same in significance as the likes and dislikes of later years. And yet, from our standpoint, we can look down and say that the infantile pleasures and pains were exhibitions of felt goods as much as the likes and dislikes of later life. We are again confronted with the distinction between the standpoints of the agent and the observer.

What point of view are we to adopt in the discussion of the origin and development of values? That of the observer, surely, for our subject in this aspect reaches back long before ideation reached perfection. And yet we must bear the distinction in mind, for we shall dis-

² Page 32.

cover that two equally reasonable interpretations of certain situations are made harmonious only by being shown to proceed from two different points of view. This preliminary word on standpoint, therefore, is in the nature of a caution and a warning.

§ 3. It is quite obvious that the meaning of the earliest stage of consciousness in terms of value can be discussed only from the standpoint of the observer. There could be neither a felt good nor an instrument directed toward an end, where no consciousness was present. What do we mean when we speak of a value in connection with the *appearance* of the earliest stage of consciousness? We cannot mean a felt good, for our whole process of observation is bound up with judgment on our part. We can only mean that the appearance of the earliest stage of consciousness was valuable to an end which *we* have in view, viz., the development of conscious life. It may be said, therefore, that, from the observer's standpoint, the earliest stage of consciousness, whatever may have been the nature of its elements, was of contributory value to the developing organism.

§ 4. This is not the place to frame a general

theory of the origin of consciousness. It is necessary, however, that we examine the origin of the earliest stage to such an extent that we may learn what element there is in it to cause *us* to ascribe *value* to the stage. Perhaps it may be said that it is sufficient that consciousness led to the creation of value on the part of the individual himself, and this is a true answer. But we may inquire further: what are the conditions of the earliest stage of consciousness which cause us to recognize it as a means to the appearance of value in the individual himself? Perhaps there are general conditions appearing which are biological concomitants of all values. Unless some such thing be found to be true, we might say that *all* evolution in the organic world was of contributory value with respect to the development of conscious life, and value would thereby be indistinguishable from causation viewed anthropocentrically. It is, of course, permissible for the spectator to look at the whole universe from the standpoint of man; an individual human being may even consider all past progress in every sphere of development as focussed on the great event of his appearance in the world. But such a way

of thinking would be regarded justly as one-sided, in view of the existence of so many other human standpoints. And so we must look upon man as man, and life as life, and not commit ourselves to an evaluation of the universe which will neglect the claims of other entities.

If we are right, therefore, in ascribing contributory value to the earliest stage of consciousness, there must be some aspect of the causal elements of the situation which is of *interest* to the development of consciousness. The observer will here assume the standpoint of consciousness itself. He might say, "I am conscious activity. When the causal nexus brought me into being, what were the factors that were responsible for my appearance? I shall regard these as of contributory value to my very existence."

It should be observed that an earliest value of the kind that I have described will be, by its very nature, not an individual element of the causal chain, or even several individual elements; it will rather be a certain *situation* that occurs in the course of evolution. This situation will not be identical with the sum of all the factors concerned in the event; it will rather be a selection of those factors which characterize the

complete situation as being conscious, not unconscious.

To recapitulate: we are seeking a situation which is marked by interest, as contrasted with previous situations which do not contain this. This situation will be the earliest contributory value from the standpoint of consciousness, as interpreted by a spectator.

If we attempted to describe *the whole situation* that marks the transition from the unconscious to the conscious, we should be trying to solve a problem which has baffled psychologists for centuries. This is not our task, let me repeat. We seek a minor situation, the point at which we spectators see interest to enter.

Whatever may be the ultimate factors which distinguish the presence of life from its absence, it is certain that, in the lowest forms of life, we have a substance of highly complex chemical structure which is extremely sensitive to contact. This substance, protoplasm, is capable of reacting to a variety of stimuli. As long as the reactions are separate events, unrelated to previous reactions in more than a mechanical way, we cannot speak of value in connection with the process. It is when the living structure

reacts to its environment in a round-about way, when some factor appears within the organism and overcomes an opposition, that we can first say that a contributory value is present. To illustrate, suppose a living, motile cell to be subject to a variety of stimuli. It swims about in a pool of water, drawn hither and thither by the influence of light, currents of water, temperature, perhaps color. If you could reckon all the stimuli and manipulate them, you could turn the cell into any direction of locomotion that you pleased. Now suppose there came a time when the cell responded in an unusual way to a stimulus. You know, however, by hypothesis, *all* of the possible stimuli from without the organism, and therefore can describe what has happened only by saying that some new factor has entered into the field and has neutralized or overcome the opposition of the stimulus which you projected. Here, I believe, we have the earliest stage of life in which we may speak of the presence of a value.

Now it is very easy to say that no situation of this kind ever occurred. I think, however, that it will be possible to show that something like it *must* have occurred. Psychologists tell

us that primitive conscious activity is marked by rudimentary elements of cognition, feeling, and will. They are not able to agree which of the three is the most primitive aspect, but some declare that all of them must be considered equally fundamental — the will-aspect, perhaps, being associated with activity in general. To have rudimentary aspects of cognition and feeling, however, it is necessary that at least two sensations be related internally, and that there be a difference *felt* between them. Now I maintain that the situation in which this could have come about would contain a relation of organism to environment in which an opposition was somehow circumvented by the organism. “Feeling the difference between two stimuli” would involve an independent action on the part of the organism. We know that life has developed so that living beings have become centers of conscious activity. There must have been some point of transition. We may be sure that, whatever the situation may have been in its entirety, it included the phenomenon of an opposition of the organism to an environmental stimulus which *failed to work* in the accustomed way. I must add, however, that no portion of this theory is

intended to conflict in any way with a strict doctrine of determinism. It is not that the organism acts in an undetermined fashion, but that the determining factor is no longer in the environment, but in the organism itself.

I may formulate the following conclusions as to the expression of the appearance of the earliest stage of consciousness in terms of value:

- (a) The appearance of the earliest stage of consciousness is, from the standpoint of the observer, of contributory value with respect to the bringing about of the existence of value from the standpoint of the organism itself.
- (b) This is true because this earliest stage of consciousness gives birth to the initial requirement of value from the standpoint of the organism, namely, that there be a center of activity to serve as the basis of an interest that is directed outward.
- (c) The significant biological aspect is the presence of a situation where an opposition of some stimulus to a living organism is overcome by a factor that is the product of a process *within* the organism.

Before I describe the origin of value from the standpoint of the individual himself, it may be well to keep the observer's point of view for

a moment, in order to determine what kind of value must be ascribed to the later developments of conscious activity from the standpoint of the observer. It seems to me that there is an *a priori* answer to this question. All values from the standpoint of the observer are contributory. This is true (*a*) because they are estimated, judged values, and (*b*) because it would be absurd to speak of a good that was *felt* by an observer with respect to a process in nature. One doesn't *feel* the good of a rainstorm. He estimates its good with reference to the supply of water in rivers and wells, or the effect of it upon the crops. The immediate values of felt coolness, the sparkle of light on the globules, etc., have nothing to do with the process as *process*.

The observer, therefore, in making a survey of the development of conscious activity in the individual from its lowest to its highest forms, will recognize as values those developments which tend toward the end of value from the standpoint of the individual himself. Instinct, intelligence, memory, ideation, sympathy, etc., all will be contributory, from the observer's standpoint.

Now it must be evident that the observer's standpoint, although it is the necessary point of view of the critic and the basis of all discussion of every kind, is not very productive as a method for the consideration of value. We need to take the standpoint of the individual consciousness itself, in order to arrive at the relations between the two classes of value. Two ways of doing this are open: (*a*) We may become introspective and seek the relation of the goods that we feel to the goods that we find useful. This method was that which gave me the initial distinction between immediate and contributory values. (*b*) Although our discussion itself must remain contributory in character, we can, however, look at the development of conscious activity from the standpoint of the individual himself. We view the process as a whole, yes, but we consider how one particular element of the whole is related to the other elements of the situation. The center from which we direct our attention to surrounding factors is the center of conscious activity that has come into being with the appearance of a particular consciousness. The relations between this center of activity and its environment will be values if they contain the element of interest.

The earliest stage of consciousness, as we have seen, contains a *difference felt*, and from the observer's standpoint the appearance of this stage is of contributory value. Can we speak of this earliest stage of consciousness in terms of value from the standpoint of the organism? Perhaps not at the very moment of appearance, for the felt difference has no relation to a *pre-existent* center of activity. But suppose the difference to take unto itself a new object of discrimination. Suppose that there is now present, in the most elementary form of perception, recognition of three *different*s which constitute a little environment. Suppose, as we must, the presence of rudimentary feeling. It seems to me that, from this very earliest moment when the individual merits the title of individual, there is a situation which may be described in terms of value from the individual's own standpoint. There is a center of activity; the comparison between the elementary perceptions is contributory toward future actions from that center; they are, therefore, contributory values.

§ 5. What of the feeling-aspect? From the observer's standpoint, these elements are of contributory value. Feelings of pleasure and pain,

however primitive, would act as warnings or as encouragement to the organism to desist from or persist in certain activities, just as perception of "differents," the original end of feelings, is to help the organism get on with his environment. In this respect, the standpoints of the individual himself and of the observer are in agreement. But the fact that in conscious activity every cognitive element has its accompanying feeling-tone or feeling-attitude gives a different color to the standpoint of the individual. The sensation which I get by touching a hot stove is accompanied by a feeling of pain; but the idea of the stove which I retain is accompanied by a feeling-attitude which is more complex than the pain which I experienced, for the reason that the idea of the stove is something more than hot-object. The various sensations which serve as the basis of my idea of the stove enter into a process of comparison with the ideas of past sensations. The feeling-attitude toward the idea of stove, therefore, is not a feeling accompanying a "simple sensation," but one accompanying an idea that is full of inferential import from past experience. Stated in a proposition, this observation would

read: The feeling-attitude which accompanies an idea is different from the feeling which accompanies a simple sensation.

§ 6. How can this distinction best be expressed? Feelings are feelings, and the difference to which I refer can hardly be a psychological difference. I believe that it can best be made in terms of value. We may say that the feeling which accompanies a simple sensation is of contributory value to the individual (from the standpoints of both individual and observer), but that the feeling toward the idea is of immediate value. In other words, when the cognitive process, by comparison and memory, develops ideas, there arise accompanying feelings which have exceeded the function of feelings which accompany sensations. The latter were contributory to the welfare of the individual; the former comprise the feeling-side of the individual's relation to his environment. From his conscious activity as a center, cognitive and feeling elements together are relating that center to surrounding reality; his environment grows like the concentric circles of ripples which move outward from the place where a stone has struck the water.

I have formulated this theory with reference to a mature conscious activity. The method of introspection facilitated the problem. Now, however, we may apply the theory to early conscious activity which cannot be examined by introspection. In this connection we shall find it equally satisfying.

§ 7. The feeling element which is associated with the cognitive element in the very earliest appearance of consciousness is wholly contributory from the standpoints of both observer and organism. The feeling elements that accompany the various cognitive elements as they arise, are likewise contributory, at the moment of their origin. But the comparisons between cognitive elements that are recorded in a rudimentary memory are accompanied by feelings which, though contributory from the observer's point of view, are the psychological basis of a new kind of value, immediate in character. We might, therefore, speak of contributory values as the stuff out of which immediate values arise.

A corollary of this theory of immediate value must not be neglected. It follows that, in the case of a mature consciousness, one must distinguish between feelings that arise unaccom-

panied by reflection, and those which have been influenced by the cognitive processes. For example, I must distinguish between the feeling of pain that comes to me when I touch a hot stove in the dark and the dislike for that feeling which almost instantaneously follows. The former feeling is of contributory value to me in prompting me to remove my hand; the latter marks my attitude toward my experience, and is an immediate value. It may be objected: Did you not say, however, that my liking for grapes must be distinguished from my thought about that liking, the actual liking being immediate, and the thought contributory? Certainly, and it must not be supposed that, by a feeling-attitude which accompanies reflection, I mean the reflection itself. The distinction here is wholly within feeling. In the example of grapes, my liking for grapes as an immediate value is to be distinguished from the primitive feeling accompanying the sensation that I receive when I first put a grape into my mouth.

§ 8. It is not my purpose in this chapter to go beyond a discussion of the interrelation of values with respect to their origin. From the consideration of their origin, however, it is

possible to point out two divergent directions in the development of conscious activity. One of these starts with the comparison of cognitive elements in the primitive organism and develops through memory, ideation, intelligence, intellection, judgment, etc., to knowledge, the highest point of contributory value. The other direction of development is toward a growth of the individual's environment by the accumulation of feeling-attitudes which accompany the various cognitive elements. These two functions in conscious activity are never separated in any action, but they are nevertheless always distinct in character. And although feeling is never present without cognition, it is not necessary that a feeling-attitude which is recalled by the recognition of an object be accompanied by the *same* cognitive elements that were the original cause of the attitude. My attitude of liking or dislike toward a man may have followed in the first instance a complicated process of judgment in which I sized him up in various ways — his disposition, the color of his hair, etc. When I see the man again, the perception of him recalls my attitude, which is the same as it was before, although the elements which enter into my perception have been vastly simplified.

I believe that the two branches of conscious activity which I have described embody a more fundamental distinction than that made by Bergson between instinct and intelligence. Bergson distinguishes instinct and intelligence as being two modes of life's action on the material world, "directly, by creating an *organized* instrument to work with; or else it [life] can effect it *indirectly* through an organism which, instead of possessing the required instrument naturally, will itself construct it by fashioning inorganic matter."³ According to Bergson, intelligence is characterized by its ability to make tools out of artificial objects; it would therefore be contributory. But instinct may also construct tools,⁴ so that it must also be counted as contributory. Later, however, Bergson⁵ identifies instinct with sympathy. It seems to me that tool-constructing (even out of organic matter only) and the feeling-attitude of sympathy are too different ever to be united in one term. I therefore believe that the distinction between instinct and intelligence as expounded by Bergson cannot be fundamental.

³ Bergson, Henri, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Mitchell, 142.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 140.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 176.

The results of the discussion contained in this chapter may be summarized as follows:

§ 1. Neither contributory nor immediate values require the presence of judgment for their existence.

§ 2. There are two possible standpoints from which values may be discussed, that of the observer and that of the organism which values.

§ 3. From the observer's standpoint, the appearance of consciousness and all the elements of consciousness are contributory in value, both as to their origin and as to their persistence.

§ 4. The biological beginnings of value lie in this: that some stimuli are dangerous for an organism, and the organism overcomes them by a process originating within itself.

§ 5. Feeling is contributory in origin, but the feeling-attitudes which accompany ideas rather than simple sensations are immediate, from the standpoint of the individual.

§ 6. Cognition and feeling relate the individual to his environment in ways that are never isolated, but which always remain distinct in character.

§ 7. Contributory values are the stuff out of which immediate values arise.

§ 8. The two divergent directions of the development of conscious activity, which have been described as leading to the experiencing of contributory and immediate values respectively, are more fundamentally distinct than Bergson's division into instinct and intelligence.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE

THE subject-matter of this chapter falls into two divisions. As in the discussion of the origin of values, there are here also two possible standpoints which may be taken. As observer, I may look over the course of evolution and observe judgment in the act itself; I may view the circumstances which gave rise to judgment; and I may view the content of judgment in its relation to the development of value in the individual. Or, from the standpoint of the individual himself, I may ask what values were first expressed in language by the individual, how the conception of value came to develop in the consciousness of the individual, and to what limit the process of evaluation may be carried.

It must be remembered, although it need not lead to confusion, that the field of the second division proposed for discussion is less inclusive than the first. From the observer's standpoint, I consider all types of judgment, not alone those judgments which *state* values. Judgment is here

regarded in its aspect as the climax of development of the cognitive function. Judgments in general, therefore, will be contributory, according to the rule that all the elements of conscious activity, from the standpoint of the observer, are contributory both as to their origin and as to their persistence.¹ From the individual's standpoint, however, our attention is restricted to those cases of judgment which *bring to expression* immediate or contributory values.

At one point, it must be said, the standpoints of the observer and the individual may almost merge. Such a phenomenon was not possible in the case of the origin of values, because there had not developed a process of conscious reflection. In the case of the judgment, however, it is possible for the individual to look back on the act of judgment and verify the result of the act. So that, in discussing the *content* of the judgment, it is immaterial whether we observers anticipate the individual in his verification or let him do it himself. In this case, therefore, the distinction between the two standpoints, while present, is immaterial to the discussion. For convenience I have placed this section of

¹ Page 43, §3.

the argument under the same heading as that of the act of judgment, because judgments in general are treated of in both sections.

I may, then, divide the discussion as follows: I. Judgments *as* values (Standpoint of the observer: A. Acts of judgment as values; B. Content of judgments as values (Standpoints merge). II. Judgments *of* values (Standpoint of the individual).

I. JUDGMENTS *AS* VALUES

In discussing judgments as values, it is necessary to distinguish between the act of judging and the content of the judgment. An act of judging is called forth in obedience to stimuli in a particular set of circumstances. The presence or absence of value in the act itself must be judged with reference to these particular circumstances and not to any later usefulness of the judgment. The value of any judgment, however, may also be determined with reference to its subsequent effect upon the activity of the individual — whether it is found to be serviceable as a guide for future action. Value in this instance is determined with respect to its content. Each of these cases will be discussed in turn.

A. ACTS OF JUDGMENT AS VALUES

§ 1. The act of judgment has been contrasted with the content of the judgment. This language, though convenient, is inaccurate, for it is evident that in considering the act of judgment we are considering the *judgment*, and that the judgment without content would not be a judgment. What I mean, therefore, is rather that here the act of judgment is discussed with its content, but with reference only to the particular stimuli which call it forth. For example, if I discuss the judgment "It is a fine day" with reference to the *act*, I discuss its meaning with regard to the circumstances which caused me to make it, not with reference to the thunderstorm which came up during the afternoon. Just as the act of judgment can be approached only from the standpoint of the observer, so is the discussion of the content as *caused* only to be carried out from that standpoint.

§ 2. Since from the standpoint of the observer all values are contributory,² the question is not as to what kind of values acts of judgment are, but whether acts of judgment are values at all. The answer seems to follow di-

² Page 43.

rectly from a point made in a preceding chapter,³ that, from the standpoint of the observer, values comprise whatever tends to the development of value from the standpoint of the individual himself. Under such a category are included all the developments of the cognitive function of conscious activity. For this reason I maintain that all acts of judgment are contributory.

(a) But there may be some doubt expressed as to whether certain cases of acts of judgment may be deemed contributory. What of acts of existential judgment, false judgment, and theoretical (vs. "useful") judgment? These distinctions are made from the standpoint of the observer with reference to the *content*, however, and, according to the rule just laid down, the content must be considered here only with reference to the time of the act and the circumstances which caused the act. In such a light, it will be seen that no matter what the content may be, the act of judgment must, like every other act, be a *caused* act. Furthermore, it is a caused act within the cognitive field of consciousness; that is, the causal process takes place

³ Page 43.

within the organism itself. Therefore the act of judgment, whatever be the content, always *adds* to the functioning of conscious activity, and, since whatever adds to the development of interest around a center of activity directed outward is contributory,⁴ all acts of judgment are contributory.

B. CONTENT OF JUDGMENTS AS VALUES

It was comparatively easy to maintain that acts of judgment are contributory. One had merely to view the evolutionary process and see a series of caused actions directed outward from a center of activity called consciousness. Every element of this process is seen to be contributory to its smooth working; every act is the overcoming of obstacles that impede further action.

When, however, we come to the consideration of the content of the judgment with reference to future action based on it, the case is more difficult. It may appear that certain acts of judgment, useful at the time of judging as steps in the active process, are valuable only as acts, later losing their value. Judgment is different

⁴ Pages 44-45.

from lower forms of cognition in that it may be preserved in memory and expressed by an artificial medium. (Of course, the *terms* of judgment may also be remembered and expressed. "Ideation" would be more accurate than "judgment," here.) The question of the permanence of the content as value arises. When is the content valuable as well as the act? The test is the future usefulness of the content.

The individual himself has now arrived at the high plane of judgment.⁵ He may therefore discuss the matter himself, or we observers may do it for him; the two standpoints will not differ in their result.

I shall endeavor to substantiate the following thesis:

The content of judgments is contributory when the judgments are true, and may be contributory when the judgments are false but when the terms of the judgments are signs of real entities.

The question of truth or falsity was immaterial when consideration of the judgment was restricted to the act, and its content to the

⁵ Cf. page 55.

particular circumstances which called it forth. But when the value of the judgment is considered with reference to future actions on the part of the individual, the question of truth or falsity becomes important. If I find, when I come to verify a judgment, that I have been wrong, the content of that judgment will not be as useful to me as it would have been, had I been right in my judging. "It will not rain" may serve to overcome my hesitation as to whether I shall take an umbrella, but, if it does rain, I shall not keep dry.

(1) True Judgments Are Contributory as to Content

§ 3. We have already ascertained that acts of judgment are contributory. Truth, however, is a term which does not apply to judgment in the act. At what point, therefore, it may be asked, does the term "truth" become applicable?

Of course the answer depends upon one's theory of the judgment. I can only state my position as a basis for discussion. I hold that truth is the expression in the judgment of real relations. A true judgment is one that ex-

presses a relation between real terms. It is evident that two requirements must be fulfilled if a judgment is to be true: the terms must be signs of real entities, and the relation between the terms must be a real relation.

§ 4. Now this criterion of truth is an extremely hard one. It may take a judgment a long time to become verified; one may never be quite certain about the truth of some particular judgment. On the other hand, some judgments require no verification at all. When I formulate a definition, I state the equality of two signs, and no special proof or verification is necessary, because the terms are signs invented for the same entity. Such a definition would be a mathematical definition of a circle, a line, etc. It may easily happen, however, that the explanatory term of the definition will require some measure of verification. We speak of "good definitions" and "poor definitions," according as the explanatory term marks off accurately a special portion of reality. Thus, if I define a horse to be a four-legged animal or a white quadruped, I shall not form a good definition, because the explanatory term will be either too inclusive or too exclusive. No one

would deny the *truth* of the proposition "The horse is a four-legged animal"; but every one would say that the proposition "The horse is a white quadruped" is false. The former judgment relates terms that are signs of real entities, but the latter judgment relates terms between which there is no equality as respects the portions of reality for which they stand. One judgment is true, the other false; and yet they are both poor definitions.

There is apparently some confusion here. "Poor definition" means one that is not valuable, or as valuable as it might be. But both true and false definitions, as we see, may be poor. It is obvious, then, that *the criteria of truth and value are not the same*. The criterion of truth has been mentioned. It is now necessary to discuss the relation of truth to value, and to do so, we must discover where the two criteria differ.

§ 5. The thesis which I laid down was, "True judgments are contributory." This proposition is the pragmatists' "Truth is useful." It by no means follows that "All contributory judgments are true" (the converse). In order to make clear the distinction, it will be

necessary to discuss the *end* to which judgments are contributory or useful.

Truth itself has no need of an end; it is simply the expression in judgment of real relations. Some authors have attempted to infer that truth is an end-in-itself, a given value. This, however, is illicit. I may indeed *make* truth an end, and it will thereby become a given good, an immediate value; but, according to the common realistic definition to which I adhere, truth is something apart from the interest of any individual. It does not arise from within the organism; it is rather the effect in consciousness of what is brute and obstinate in reality. The individual consciousness is not forced to become interested in any part of reality except that with which it comes into contact. It may find the truth; it may not; but it is forced in any case to attach value to its environment.

Truth, therefore, represents the accurate relation of portions of reality in the judgment, while value represents the relation of portions of reality to my interest. And what is the nature of this interest? It is that of conscious activity directed toward an end whose character is disclosed in the evolutionary process itself:

conscious activity tends to describe and interpret reality in terms of itself; the individual by nature is ego-centric from his instinct of self-preservation to his most altruistic impulses. Note that ego-centric does not mean selfish; it means rather that the individual of matured conscious activity feels a sympathy toward, feels drawn toward the whole universe, that interest from the individual center of conscious activity tends to direct itself outward as far as possible. Such is the nature of the end to which contributory values are useful.

§ 6. It will be apparent, therefore, that, while truth in itself is no value at all, true judgments, proceeding from an individual, will always be contributory to putting him into touch with the reality which opposes him and which he must conquer by interpretation. But not only does it not follow that all contributory judgments are true, but it also does not follow that all true judgments are of the greatest, or of equal contributory value. There are degrees of contributory value, but there are no degrees of truth. One truth is just as true as another, but it may be of much less contributory value. The existential judgment, for instance, is true

and contributes to my taking stock of brute reality, so to speak; but the judgment "Fire exists" is not so contributory as "Fire burns" — yet both are equally true.

(2) *False Judgments May Be Contributory
When Their Terms Are Signs of Real
Entities*

To prove this portion of my thesis, it will be necessary to revert for a moment to discussion of the *act* of judgment. I shall ask, "What characterizes an act of judgment?"

§ 7. Acts of judgment were proved to be contributory.⁶ My proof assumed that, in the case of every act of judgment, there is always present in consciousness a causal situation of which the act is the result. We may accordingly find cases of apparent judgment where there are no acts of judgment, properly so-called. A parrot may be taught to say, "This is just as good!" but he will not perform an act of judgment, because conscious interest is lacking. The schoolboy may write on his slate "The sun shines" a hundred times, and there probably is only one act of judgment, made in

⁶ Page 58.

connection with the first writing. A proposition, done in writing, and buried in the Sahara desert, forgotten absolutely (*pro argumento*) by its author, and never again seen by man, is not an act of judgment. In none of these cases is a value present, because the conscious situation is lacking. To be contributory, judgment must be associated with *interest*, and this interest may be either from the standpoint of the observer in the act itself, or in an act of recognition on the part of the individual.

§ 8. It was easy to show that acts of false judgment are contributory from the standpoint of the observer, as well as acts of true judgment. It is now questioned whether the content of the false judgment remains contributory after the act, with reference to further action on the part of the individual.

From the preceding discussion it is apparent that our consideration assumes that the false judgment *is* related to future action on the part of the individual — otherwise the element of interest would disappear. Providing that its terms have reference to portions of reality, the situation of the false judgment is that the individual has stated a relation between signs of

real entities which does not hold in reality. Now the end to which judgments are contributory, as we have found, is the relation of reality to a center of conscious activity. By the false judgment, the individual has related portions of reality in terms of consciousness, but he has related them falsely.

Ideation is contributory, along with the other developments of the cognitive function. Therefore, the terms of the false judgment are contributory, because they relate portions of reality to a center of conscious activity. It is asked whether the incorrect *relation* of these terms may ever be contributory.

My answer is, "Yes!" The individual *thinks*, *believes* that the false judgment is true (falsity is, therefore, from the standpoint of the observer, here also). He acts on this judgment as if it were true. Later he may discover that it was false; he may never discover its falsity. Which ever happens, the false judgment will serve, in all probability, as a basis of future action. We make mistakes in our judgment, but learn by experience. It would be very satisfying if we always judged correctly, but it would be ghastly if we never judged except when we were sure

that we were judging truly. To behave in such an impossible manner would necessitate our accepting the judgments of one in whom we had as great faith as we have in our perceptions. Independent judgment would be denied to us. We could never make our own verifications. If we never made mistakes, *we* never should have certainty of anything.

§ 9. It is conceivable, however, that a false judgment may sometimes have the opposite effect of blocking future activity along the particular lines of its terms. An example of such a judgment would be an obstinate prejudice. An obstinate prejudice implies a refusal by act of will to proceed in verification. Such a prejudice could not be called contributory (unless we were to speak of it as a negative value, contributory to the end of imbecility). Mistakes, therefore, no more than true judgments, are ends in themselves; but both are, or may be, contributory to the biological end of value.

(3) *Measurement of the Degree to Which a Judgment is Contributory*

§ 10. It was stated in § 6⁷ that, although there are no degrees of truth, there are degrees

⁷ Page 65.

of value. In the present connection, it will be interesting to inquire whether there is some way of measuring the degree to which a judgment is contributory. This investigation, needless to say, is quite independent of that as to what degrees of value the individual himself fixes in judgment. The latter investigation belongs to the section treating of judgments *of* values. The present question is most conveniently thought of as from the standpoint of the observer, although there would be nothing to prevent the individual himself from answering it. Indeed, if he wishes to coordinate his aims in life, he will think very seriously of this matter, and try to make his judgments *of* values harmonize with the degree to which his judgments *are* values. That is, he will try not to attribute greater or less value to anything in judgment, than the judgment actually is worth, when considered with reference to the whole career of the cognitive function. But, as I have before remarked, attributing value in judgments is only a small part of judging in general; and consideration of the degree to which judgments are valuable is a larger and more inclusive subject than that of the degree to which value-judgments are valuable.

A common-sense answer to our question would be that the degree to which a contributory judgment is contributory is the extent to which it possesses "practicality." But, as "practicality" is a general term including a number of elements, it will be worth while to analyze it.

There appear to me to be at least three considerations involved in practicality. (a) To be contributory, a judgment must be concerned with reality, both in its terms and usually in the relation expressed between the terms. *Nearness*, or *readiness of reference*, to "brute" reality is a prominent feature here. If a term is too far away from the portion of reality of which it is a sign, it may easily have lost sharpness of distinction; its flavor may be gone. This is the reason why abstruse subjects are often best discussed with the use of words that are metaphorical, but very near to familiar objects. The effectiveness and permanent application of teaching by allegory is thus explained. If very theoretical terms are employed, their value will often be proportionate to the readiness with which they may be referred back to portions of reality. Thus, a formula of mechanics may be highly technical, but may be extremely valuable

because of the ease with which it may be applied to reality. (b) Another factor which enters into the degree to which judgments of contributory values are contributory is their relation to the *special environment* of the individual. A judgment may be very useful to a physician, but comparatively useless to an artisan. The biological end to which judgments are contributory is the same for all men, but the field of judgment is so immense that different individuals must work from different centers in the field, and no man can hope to attain all knowledge. Thus the practicality of a judgment will also be measured with reference to its possible application to the individual's line of activity. (c) What applies to the single individual here applies also to the human race. Humanity has an environment distinct from that of insects or birds, and the degrees of contributory value may well be distinguished by considering the degrees to which needs are common to mankind. It must not be inferred, however, that we have knowledge of any judgments that do *not* affect human environment. Such a possibility is excluded by the result of our study of the origin of value in conscious-

ness. I mean merely that certain judgments will be found to be more, or less, contributory to mankind, according as they overcome the oppositions common to the race rather than to a special class of men.

§ 11. Finally, it may be objected that it is possible, by manipulation of terms, to arrive at judgments which have no contributory function at all. I may speak of these as theoretical judgments. This class of judgments will not include those judgments which may be referred by a round-about way to reality, or to those which might have a *possible* application at some future time, but only to those which, for the sake of argument, are purely speculative and unreal. If there are any such judgments, their existence is still not a good argument against my theory of values. For, together with my general acceptance of realism, I hold that judgments are *additive* to reality; i.e., they are portions of reality itself, insofar as they are preserved in memory. The extent to which such judgments are contributory will be the degree to which the individual is interested in the imaginary terms.

Division I of this chapter may be summarized as follows:

I. Judgments *as* Values (Standpoint of the Observer).

A. *Acts* of Judgment as Values.

§ 1. More accurately, the act of judgment is here discussed with its content, but only with reference to the particular stimuli which call it forth.

§ 2. Acts of judgment are a development of the cognitive function of consciousness. All such developments are contributory values. Therefore, acts of judgment are contributory values.

(a) Whatever be the character of the content, an act of judgment is a *caused act* in the sphere of conscious activity; hence it is of contributory value.

B. *Content* of Judgments as Values.

This topic deals with the future usefulness of the content.

(1) True judgments are contributory as to content.

§ 3. For a judgment to be true, its terms must be signs of real entities, and the relation between the terms must be a real relation.

§ 4. This criterion of truth is not the cri-

terion of value, as is shown by the illustration that a true and a false definition may be equally "poor."

§ 5. Truth has no *end*; value has a biological end.

§ 6. True judgments, however, are values because they contribute to the biological end of value.

(2) False judgments may be contributory when their terms are signs of real entities.

§ 7. To be valuable, a judgment must involve *interest*.

§ 8. The terms of false judgments, when they are signs of real entities, are contributory. The false relation is contributory if the individual uses it as the basis of future action; i.e., if it retains the individual's interest.

§ 9. Some false judgments may stifle interest in both terms and relation. These might be considered to be of negative value.

(3) Measurement of the degree to which a judgment is contributory.

§ 10. The *degree* to which the content of a judgment is contributory is the degree of its nearness or readiness of reference to reality,

its nearness to the special environment of the judging individual, and its universality of application to mankind.

§ 11. The content of purely theoretical or imaginary judgments is contributory in proportion to the interest of the individual in the theoretical terms.

II. JUDGMENTS OF VALUES

We now come to the discussion of judgments of values by the individual. Let us gain a clear conception of the subject-matter of this division. It is quite obvious that an individual may make judgments without *expressing* values from his own standpoint. He cannot make a judgment, of course, without expressing a value considered from the observer's standpoint.⁸ But he may make judgments that involve interest to him personally, and yet not think of his interest. The judgments by which a man expresses his needs and his wants, and declares what is contributory to the satisfaction of those needs and wants, form but a small proportion of his daily speech and thoughts. The confusion that is rife in this branch of the subject is largely due

⁸ §§2-9.

to the habit of some of mingling the standpoints of the observer and the individual. It is also due to the practice of certain writers of considering truth as a "value-judgment." Having refuted this theory in a preceding chapter,⁹ we shall do well to keep in mind the fact that, in the present case, we are dealing with only a very limited class of judgments.

Our present investigation is parallel, in a way, with that of the origin of contributory and immediate values. There ¹⁰ a situation was sought where immediate and contributory values first emerged in consciousness. Here we seek a situation where values first become expressed in the judgment, where the individual first expresses his own interest. The former investigation was entirely from the standpoint of the observer; the latter will be from that of the individual himself.

In the discussion of the interrelation of values with respect to their origin, the data considered were biological. In the present investigation one might consider facts connected with the development of speech observed in savage tribes

⁹ Chapter II.

¹⁰ Chapter III.

(phylogenetic), or, as is more convenient, facts may be adduced with reference to the development of speech in the child (ontogenetic). Introspection may aid in confirming results obtained by the other methods.

The reason why we are concerned with the *origin* of immediate and contributory judgments rather than with their interrelation in an individual of mature growth, is that we recognize, at the start, that a mature individual uses two separate and distinct kinds of judgments of value, immediate and contributory. It is upon this hypothesis that the whole discussion rests.

The investigation may be divided conveniently into two parts:

A. Origin of immediate judgments; B. Origin of contributory judgments.

A. ORIGIN OF IMMEDIATE JUDGMENTS

§ 12. The first words that a child uses are names of objects. He is taught words that symbolize certain perceptions. There is no question of expressing value here. The early stages of speech are just as mechanical as the act of perception itself. The fixation of *meaning* to certain verbal sounds does not imply that the

child has the ability to *reflect upon* that meaning. He names the objects that attract his attention.

A young child has wants and needs. His attention is attracted to the objects that satisfy these wants. Some of his wants are necessary to his life — mother, water. But he may reach out his hands to grasp the moon, and cry, “Moon!” if he were taught the word that symbolizes that object. Many of the words that he first learns are words that symbolize objects that he wants and needs. Some of them merely satisfy the need of locating himself in his immediate environment. But in no case is there any question of his expressing a value.

Identification of objects with symbols of expression, therefore, is not fixing values upon objects, however valuable those objects may be to him from the standpoint of an observer. But the child comes to learn other words. Some of these may express feelings of desire, as “want,” “like.” He learns to combine these words with certain objects: “Love mother”; “Want milk.” The case as regards value differs here. The child is now expressing a feeling-attitude in a simple form of judgment. He is expressing an

immediate value in words. He recognizes his personal interest.

Our conclusion, therefore, with respect to the origin of judgments of immediate value may be expressed in the following proposition:

The individual recognizes his interest when a situation occurs in which he identifies a feeling-attitude with words.

B. ORIGIN OF CONTRIBUTORY JUDGMENTS

§ 13. I have illustrated the way in which a judgment of immediate value may be expressed very simply. The case is not so simple with respect to contributory values. The child has a need; let us say he is thirsty. He may have the need and be unable to connect his need with speech; he may only cry or make foolish sounds. He may know the substance water by name, and call out "Water!" He may express not only the object of his desire, but the desire itself, and say, "Want water." (Here we have the expression of an immediate value in the judgment.) In the last named case, he connects the object of desire with the desire itself, but he does not *express* in the judgment the way in which the object will satisfy the desire. We

infer that when he gets the water his desire will disappear; but he does not express the fact that the water is for the purpose of satisfying the desire, that the water will be the means of attaining the end of his wish.

In the judgment "Want water!" there is something lacking to make it express the fact that water is of contributory value. The need and the object of the need are expressed, but not the purpose of the need. To have the latter, there must be added some word or words that will symbolize the object in the process of satisfying the need. Such symbolism is afforded by expressions of purpose, the simplest of which is the infinitive (with *to* or in *ing*). "Want water to drink" or "Want water for drinking" expresses in a simple way (*a*) the desire, (*b*) the object of desire, and (*c*) the fact that the object is the principal means of satisfying the desire. The third is attained by the use of a word that shows the desire in process of fulfilment by the use of the object. Here is the first case where a contributory value finds *expression*.

Reflection will show us that contributory values are always accompanied in their expression by some statement of their end. They are con-

tributary *to* something, not simply given as good. The satisfaction of thirst is an immediate value, given as good. I may connect that value with the object water, however, without thinking specifically of water as "good for" satisfying my thirst. The latter process is the outcome of reasoning about my desire. It contains the reflection that the object that I already want is wanted for a purpose which I now make clear to myself. Thus introspection confirms my previous illustration.

It may therefore be stated as a proposition, that *the individual gives expression to a contributory value first when he uses words that show how an object of desire satisfies the end of desire.*

§ 14. I have described the simplest situations in which the individual expresses an immediate and a contributory value. There is a further stage of expression of contributory value. This comes to view when the individual goes beyond his own desires in expressing values by judgment. He sees that others beside himself have desires and that they may be satisfied by certain means. Certain desires he finds to be common to his kind. Contributory value

may then be expressed by a general proposition, "Water is good to drink." He may extend the application of value still farther. He may apply it to objects which further the processes of nature, and may say, for example, "The soil is good for nourishing the plant." This is one way in which contributory values may become more and more objective, i.e., divorced from the individual who makes the evaluation. So that in expressing values by the judgment, we may state that *contributory values arise in intimate association with immediate values, but that, as the power of expression develops, they may become entirely free from immediate values.*

This division of the chapter may be summarized as follows:

A. Origin of Immediate Judgments.

§ 12. The individual first expresses an immediate value when a situation occurs in which he symbolizes a feeling-attitude by a form of words.

B. Origin of Contributory Judgments.

§ 13. He first expresses a contributory value when he uses words that show how an object of desire satisfies the end of desire.

§ 14. Contributory values in their expression in the judgment arise in intimate association with immediate values, but, as the power of expression develops, they become free from the immediate, so that the individual of mature growth may express in the judgment two distinct classes of values, immediate and contributory.

CHAPTER V

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR CO-EX- ISTENCE

IN Chapter I, two classes of values were defined and distinguished. They were discovered by introspection, but it was found that there is a psychological basis for the distinction. Immediate values are grounded in the feeling-aspect of consciousness; contributory, in the cognitive. The brief treatment of Chapter I, however, is inadequate to the importance of the distinction. In this chapter, I purpose more fully to discuss value-relations of the individual to his environment. To do this successfully, it will be necessary first to inquire just what is meant, in this connection, by the term "environment."

The chapter may therefore be divided into two main topics:

I. Environment; II. Environment and Values.

I. ENVIRONMENT

§ 1. The word "environment" is not restricted in common usage to the surroundings

of a living being. We speak of the "environs" of a city, using an almost identical word. It would be perfectly possible to speak of the environment of a chair or a building. But most commonly it is used of the surroundings of a plant or animal; that is, an organism is contrasted with surrounding organisms or objects. As our sphere of discussion is limited to the animal kingdom, we may at the outset limit its usage to the contrast between an animal organism and its surroundings.

§ 2. How much of an organism's surroundings does "environment" include? In an extended sense of the word, we might say that there is no part of the world of matter and motion that does not belong to the environment of an organism. The influence of physical laws is so far-reaching that very remote physical disturbances may influence an organism quite apart from his knowledge. The conditions of environment may be altered by sun-spots, by an earthquake thousands of miles distant, or by the temperature of currents of water that wash the coast nearest an inland region. Man's environment, in a sense, is the world.

We see, therefore, that environment may be

considered to include a great deal. This most inclusive use of the word, however, cannot be useful to us in a discussion of value; for, by adopting it, we shall only find a synonym for "the world." It is desirable for us to restrict it in its application. Now there is a time-difference between the stimuli that affect an organism from its environment. The sun is ultimately responsible for my perception of light, but the immediate cause is certain light-waves that strike the retina of the eye. There is a point at which the sensitive protoplasm of an organism comes into contact with the world beyond itself; there are immediate stimuli that may be contrasted with those more remote in time and space. It is to these immediate stimuli that I shall refer when I speak of the action of environment with reference to an organism. Environment will designate that part of the world which directly influences it, that part with which the organism comes into contact.

§ 3. In reference to a very primitive organism, this conception of environment is perfectly clear. No explanation was necessary when the word was thus used in Chapter III. There the contrast between organism and environment was

biological, rather than psychological. It was clear what was meant by saying that the biological indication of the presence of value from the standpoint of the organism was the presence of a situation in which the organism responded to dangerous stimuli from the environment by a process originating within itself. The earlier stages of conscious activity were taken in their biological significance, and they were described with reference to the acts themselves.

In the case of a mature individual, however, there is a complication. Here conscious activity has reached a highly developed form. Is it useful for us still to maintain the biological standpoint? When I speak of "my environment," am I using the phrase in the biological or the psychological sense? The answer that I give to these questions will depend largely upon my philosophical pre-disposition. The problem of the relation between mind and body comes to the fore. And I am in danger of entering into an epistemological tangle. Let us examine a few of the ways that various philosophers may regard "environment."

(a) The materialist, or the instrumental pragmatist, preserves the biological standpoint

intact. To him conscious activity is a function of certain cells of the body, and "consciousness" is as much a part of him as his hands or his feet. The relation of man to his environment is the relation of man considered as body plus conscious activity.

(b) Those who make a difference between mental and non-mental, whether they be interactionists or psycho-physical parallelists, may think of environment as the relation of consciousness to its objects. Environment may mean "mental environment" or "physical environment." It may have to do with the relation of mind to its objects (psychological) or the relation of the physical organism to surrounding objects (biological) or the relation of consciousness to objects in the world (psycho-physical).

(c) Spiritualists (i.e., subjective and objective idealists and the like) would find the contrast one between one and another kind of mental entities. But the nature of the contrast between organism and environment would vary with the degree of "objectivity" attributed to the physical world.

§ 4. Now beside being intellectually dishon-

est, it would invalidate my reasoning if I should use the contrast between organism and environment first in one sense, then in another. The question of philosophical pre-disposition, on the other hand, is not nearly so important as that I find a meaning of the contrast that will be most useful in the development of my theory of value.

The "process originating within itself," which was seen to be the biological concomitant of the origin of value from the individual's standpoint, is likely to be agreed to be a very rudimentary form of conscious activity. In this case, therefore, conscious activity was described wholly from the biological point of view. This standpoint was found to be entirely adequate to the discussion of my theory of value. Why not, then, keep to the biological standpoint in my discussion of the values of a mature individual? It will be seen that, in man, mature conscious activity can still be described in terms of the standpoint of the organism without trespassing beyond the biological aspect.

§ 5. This point of view is nearest like that of the instrumental pragmatists, as developed in *Creative Intelligence*.¹ It must not be in-

¹ New York, 1917.

ferred, however, that I count myself one of their followers. In this connection there are two especial points of difference between us.

(a) I must refuse to commit myself to a decision as to whether existent "reality" is a certain or an uncertain quantity. By "reality" I mean the physical world. If, however, the term be taken to include all that happens, I should agree that it is quantitatively uncertain.

(b) As a logical consequence of their standpoint, the instrumental pragmatists get rid of "sensations" in the classical use of that term. Organisms differ, according to them, chiefly by the "emotional tone" of the relation of "organic complexes" to other things.² While I also emphasize the importance of feeling-attitudes in my theory of value, I am not prepared to say that the cognitive aspect of conscious activity is not of as great importance to value as the feeling-aspect. That is, I recognize that the standpoint of the individual, formed by the "orientation" of complex relations about a center, may be described with respect to the value of these relations apart from the aspect of their "emotional tone." Nevertheless, it

² Cf. Kallen, in *Creative Intelligence*, 415-416.

must be remembered that the individual acquired a standpoint of his own only when his first feeling-attitude appeared. But once the individual has attained a standpoint of his own, what were formerly relations without any "emotional tone" now become relations of interest to the individual in the cognitive aspect, without reference to the acquired "emotional tone."

§ 6. In § 2, environment was defined for our purpose as those things which act directly upon the organism as stimuli, that with which the organism is in direct contact. As this use of the word was adopted for our convenience, we must be careful not to let it become a source of annoyance. It would be such if we conceived it with scientific accuracy. For one might ask, If my conscious activity is in contact with that chair by means of light-waves which strike the retina of my eye, are the waves at the very point where they meet the retina, my environment? This would be to make a practical working definition worthless by over-refining it. Practically, we shall conceive environment to extend as far as our perception will carry us. It will include sensational experience, and also that amount of

inferential experience which is a part of our perception. But it will not include knowledge about an object which is buried in memory at the time of my perception. Thus, although I know that the wood of my chair came from a forest, and that some man cut the tree down and sawed it, planed, hammered, and polished it, the tree in the forest, the woodcutter, the saw-mill, the carpenter, the turner, and the polisher will not be included in my environment so far as my perception of the chair is concerned. If, however, the thought of these suggested itself to me as I looked at the chair, they would be included in my environment, and their importance in it would be determined by the extent to which I am familiar with them in actual experience. They would be much more important if, for instance, I had seen the very tree cut down and the whole process of manufacture of the chair, than if I had only read about how chairs are made.

The point that lies behind this argument is that conscious activity, conceived as one of the functions of an organism, is related to surrounding objects in varying degree, just as other functions of the organism are related to sur-

rounding matter. The peculiar nature of conscious activity lies in the fact that "contact with" is broader and freer here than in the case, for example, of a muscle or a hair. The importance of this difference for us is that value-relations have to do with that portion of environment with which conscious activity is in contact.

§ 7. Now conscious activity, after it has emerged from what I called in Chapter III the "earliest stage of consciousness," is in contact with environment under two aspects, cognition and feeling. I wish that this statement might be accepted without further discussion, but I fear that it will be necessary to digress a little and treat briefly of certain disputes among psychologists.

It is the fashion among psychologists to analyze their states of consciousness to find out what aspects are present, and which may exist apart from other aspects. For example, Titchener asks, "Do we ever attend without feeling?"³ He answers, Yes, and points to reflex, automatic, and ideo-motor actions, "performed without the arousal of pleasantness-unpleasant-

³ Titchener, E. B., *Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention*, 296-302.

ness in consciousness." May we, on the other hand, feel without attending? Wundt says that we may. Titchener says not. The latter adds, "I incline rather to find a fairly close parallel between degree of clearness [his criterion of attention] and degree of pleasantness-unpleasantness, and thus to regard the relation between affection and attention, on this side, not as external, but as intrinsic."

Another dispute relates to the number and nature of affective qualities. Wundt's tri-dimensional theory of feeling postulates pleasantness-unpleasantness, excitement-tranquilisation, and tension-relaxation as the three "dimensions of affection." Thereupon psychologists introspect their feelings. Some, as Titchener, find only one dimension. The tri-dimensionalists speak slightly of the "*Dogma der Lust-Unlust-theorie*."

My criticism of such disputes, of which there are many, is twofold. The psychologists who indulge in them are (a) biased by a predisposition to hold the theory of psycho-physical parallelism. Consequently, conscious activity is not conceived by them *in the act itself*, but epiphenomenally. The stimuli from environ-

ment are conceived as affecting the physical part of the organism, while it becomes of interest to inquire what happens at the same time in consciousness. Much opportunity is thereby afforded for introspective observation, but very little hope that correct conclusions may be reached. Consciousness is conceived as following alongside physical processes. It is assumed that these processes may throw off effects in consciousness, may partly do so, or may go along blissfully by themselves.

Again (*b*), the nature of these disputes implies that consciousness may be divided into "faculties." When it is asked whether attention may exist without feeling, the unit of conscious activity is set aside. Cognition, feeling, and attention lose their character as *aspects*. The mere putting of such a question almost assumes that attention and feeling are separate parts of consciousness which often appear together, but which might well be conceived sometimes to be separated, only one appearing. Attention, throughout, seems to be regarded as *cognitive attention*. At least, psychologists introspect to discover whether they are attending, and the introspective process is certainly cog-

nitive. They also introspect to discover whether they are feeling pleasantness or unpleasantness, and assume that, if they could not discover such a feeling, the feeling aspect would not be present. What about the pleasant feeling of stroking that a cat sometimes experiences? Is this dependent upon her knowing that she has it?

§ 8. Against such a point of view let me place a theory recommended by its simplicity and its ability to fit in with facts of observation.

Conscious activity is always one in its functioning. There are certain distinct aspects of conscious activity, however, and sometimes one of these is more prominent than another. Such is generally the case. It would be difficult to conceive of a situation in which attention, pleasantness or unpleasantness, and cognition were present in the same degree. Some form of contemplation would approach nearest to this condition, but contemplatives actually advise their disciples to keep attention away from feeling as far as possible.

But where conscious activity is just emerging from non-conscious, there are not such pronounced aspects. Here there is a sensitive condition which doubtless exhibits the rudiments of

cognition, feeling, and will; but none of these appears in a prominent way. It is curious how willing some psychologists (except those who are "*gefühlsempfindungen*" theorists) are to admit that feeling is of "elemental rank in consciousness" ⁴ but yet discuss the question of whether it need be present with other elements. I think that this is due to the epiphenomenalistic attitude of such writers.

In later stages of development, one aspect of conscious activity is more prominent than others. The mistake of many psychologists is their cheerful assumption that, with the prominence of one aspect over others, the others disappear. But conscious activity is in contact with environment as a whole, not in a divided state. There is no warrant whatever for the supposition that, in a mature conscious individual, aspects of conscious activity are transitory, flitting on and off the stage of consciousness. This view reeks of epiphenomenalism. The only support for such a theory is derived from introspection, which cannot be depended upon in this connection, as it is a cognitive process.

§ 9. For my present purpose, the importance

⁴ Titchener, *op. cit.*, 289.

of my theory lies in the fact that, if it be a true description of what takes place, the feeling-attitude, or the "affective side" of conscious activity, must be regarded as present, even when it is not exhibited by feelings of pleasantness-unpleasantness. The latter feelings may better be regarded as cases where the feeling side is uppermost in conscious activity, not where feeling is absent.

The obvious consequence of my theory is that conscious activity is related to environment as directly through feeling as through cognition. Logical knowledge may well be the best instrument for dealing with reality. It might be maintained (though this is open to question) that cognition is the sole means by which we increase the extent of our contact with reality. But these admissions will in no way prove that "contact with" is limited to the cognitive aspect of consciousness; they will not remove the possibility that our "contact with" contains elements of feeling which have never resulted from cognition. Furthermore, the fact that we increase our contact with reality through cognition does not prove that the feelings which are aroused by the directive influence of cognition are de-

pendent *in their whole meaning* upon the cognitive processes. They may have an independent relation to reality apart from cognition.

This doctrine may sound strange, and yet it fits in well with the facts of experience. It tells me that the portion of reality with which I am in contact is not restricted to what I am conscious of through sensations and ideas, but that it also includes that portion with which I am in contact through the feeling-element of consciousness. This is neither to say, with Rickert, that knowledge is determined through the feelings, nor with the older psychologists, that feeling is dependent upon sensation. I mean rather that the portion of reality with which I am in contact is richer and fuller in my experience of it than the knowledge of it which I obtain through the senses; and that, in defining "contact with" environment, I must include a certain relation to reality directly by feeling, and not indirectly through sensation. In the higher stages of conscious activity, the presence of sensation may be the only path to the broadening of environment; our experience of environment is always partly sensational; but in itself environment is more than relation to reality through sensation.

Of course this has nothing whatever to do with the theory that we can obtain *knowledge* directly through feeling, or the theory that we can increase our "contact with" environment by plunging into states of feeling where cognition is at a minimum.

I may give a few examples to illustrate direct contact with the environment through the feeling side of consciousness, where the latter predominates over the cognitive aspect. Such examples can be drawn only from observation of the relation of others to their environment, and from self-analysis based on knowledge gained *after* the experience that is instanced. Both of these methods of illustration apply in the following case: We notice in the experience of others and recall in our own past experience that we often conceive a sudden dislike for a person at first meeting. Later on, when we know him better, we discover why we dislike him. Traits are exhibited by him, opinions expressed, that are foreign to our point of view. Cognition has here confirmed the impression made upon us that resulted in a feeling-attitude. Women in general are reputed to be more "intuitive" in this way than men. Again, I am forced very

often to act when I am ignorant of some of the circumstances which should determine my action. On such occasions I either guess at the best course of action, or rely on a "feeling for" one course. To say that such a "feeling" is determined wholly by the general texture of my ideas and feelings, rather than by some kind of contact with the situation in hand, is to be dogmatic, and to beg the question.

I may add that my theory, if true, would prove to be of the greatest service to religious apologists. Feeling and emotion have been emphasized by most religions, so much so, in fact, that Arnold defined religion as "morality tinged with emotion." Now if the emotion associated with a religious experience (and let it be remembered that I believe feeling to be wholly psychological and "subjective") has no point of contact with reality, if, that is, religious emotion is subordinate and a by-product of consciousness, it cannot be of much greater importance to religious experience than as a stimulus to action. The Christian faith, however, makes much of love between God and man. It claims that God bestows love upon his creatures and that man can return this love. From the Christian point

of view, therefore, emotion is a way of *being* in contact with environment. I do not say *coming into* contact with a spiritual world, although mystics and quietists make much of it as a method. In point of fact, Christian teachers of ascetic theology warn their pupils not to try to obtain "spiritual sweetness," as they call it. They even claim that "spiritual dryness" is a stage of progress in advance of the spiritual sweetness that is likely to attend the first efforts for spiritual progress.

The same argument that is advanced with respect to contact with personalities on earth and with God, may also be applied to prayer and to communion with saints and angels. It proves nothing, of course. It only shows a possible means of intercourse, provided that spiritual beings form a portion of reality. It shows, too, how a worshipper need not be bound to his own conceptions of the spiritual world in order to worship effectively (that is, again, provided Christian beliefs are grounded in reality). The peasant woman of limited intelligence, who gradually comes to identify the Virgin with the grotesque statue in front of which she is praying, may not pray ineffectively. The experience

is always richer than the sensations and ideas that are derived from it.

II. ENVIRONMENT AND VALUES

Having built a foundation by discussion of the meaning of environment and of the relation of an organism to its environment, we may proceed to the erection of a theory of co-existent values. I think that it will scarcely be disputed that whatever is of interest to conscious activity is valuable from the standpoint of that conscious activity. At the emergence of consciousness, the individual acquired a standpoint of his own. Conscious activity, starting in a rudimentary way, develops and increases the scope of its function. In the process of development, it widens in its contact with environment. Its relations to environment are value relations.

§ 10. Everything with which conscious activity comes into contact is valuable both as contributory and as immediate. Inasmuch as cognition and feeling are aspects of the same consciousness, objects of the environment will be related to conscious activity both as cognitive and affective. From the cognitive point of view, these relations are relations of contribu-

tory value. The objects related are "good for" some purpose. They are guide-posts to conscious activity in its contact with environment. They help it find its way in and among other objects with which it is not in contact. They are the interests of consciousness from one point of view.

But conscious activity is also related to the objects with which it is in contact from the feeling side. These relations are relations of immediate values. It is not necessary that pleasantness-unpleasantness be recognized to make objects of immediate value. All that is necessary is that there be a feeling-tone of conscious activity, and this affective aspect is present in all but the earliest stage of consciousness. The nestful of eggs, the "never-to-be-too-much-set-upon object" of the hen (James), does not demand the presence of recognition of pleasantness on the part of the hen to make it of immediate value to her. She probably never thought of it as pleasant; it was only "never-to-be-too-much-set-upon." Kallen⁵ gives a good treatment of immediate values as relations of the organism's conscious activity to environment, but he wholly disregards the contributory aspect of value.

⁵ *Creative Intelligence*, 412 ff.

§ 11. In Chapter III, the cognitive and feeling sides of conscious activity were spoken of as two directions in which that activity has developed. They diverge from a point at which conscious activity comes into contact with environment. At only one point in the development of the organism is this divergence from an undifferentiated conscious activity to be observed, namely, at the first appearance of consciousness in an organism. But since the individual comes into contact with new factors of environment constantly, it becomes of interest to inquire just how new relations with the new objects are established.

It is quite conceivable that conscious activity, a single function exhibiting two aspects, might react to stimuli from the environment at one time chiefly in one aspect, at another, chiefly in another. That is, in the case of a mature consciousness, we cannot speak with so great a confidence of a recurrence of the primitive condition of conscious activity whenever a new contact with environment is established. Our doubt is confirmed by comparing the functions of other organs and organisms. In plants, for example, we find a great variety of highly developed

organs which serve special adaptive purposes. The organs which perform these functions took their origin from cells whose protoplasm was exceedingly sensitive to a great variety of stimuli. But when once certain cambial cells become differentiated into root, stem, leaf, or reproductive cells, it is usually very hard to change their direction of development. Of course there are exceptions: some of the hepatics have a generous susceptibility to regeneration from vegetative cells, and we all know how the shoots of some trees may be stuck into the ground with the result that root cells become differentiated from the cambium, and a tree grows up. The latter example, of course, only shows the undifferentiated character of cambial tissue; old cells seldom change their function.

Now the fact that conscious activity has two aspects which fluctuate in preponderance shows that the sensitive character of consciousness is not determined in growth along one hard and fast line. And yet this is not to say that primitive conscious activity must necessarily be reenacted every time consciousness is stimulated by a new environmental factor. Conscious activity might be just fluid enough to respond to

some stimuli on the cognitive side, and to others on the feeling side. It is extremely difficult to describe what I mean in simple language. Perhaps a very imperfect illustration may aid me. Imagine two insulated wires wound together, but connected at one end. These may represent the two aspects of conscious activity taking their origin at a point where there is no differentiation into aspects, but continuing together inseparably after differentiation has taken place. The point of connection, however, is not the only connection with environment. Connection occurs at many places along the line. The question is: Is the connection with new points made by each of the wound wires touching the environment at various points, or by a wire at each point that touches the new factor and immediately divides into two wires that make connection with the main wires?

It may seem that I am asking questions which I ought not to ask in view of my disapproval of disputes as to whether we can attend without feeling or feel without attending. This is not so, however. It is not a question of what conscious activity can do, but of how the environment comes into connection with conscious ac-

tivity. Frankly, I do not know how this real question may be answered. I do not know how to apply scientific method in such a case, and I am sure that the method of introspection would be quite inadequate, because one cannot even *observe* the feeling side of consciousness when that aspect is not predominant and exhibited in consciousness by pleasantness or unpleasantness.

At least I may be permitted to speculate on the matter. The basis for my own belief is my view of the nature of the earliest stage of consciousness. I do not believe in James's "blooming, buzzing confusion." It seems to me that this is far too complicated for the earliest stage of consciousness. It would better describe a mature state of conscious activity which never had a chance to function in some strange environment into which it was suddenly plunged. Nor do I believe that "pure sensations" are entirely "simple" (in the sense of single). I believe that the earliest stage of conscious activity is a situation where at least two factors are discriminated and the feeling side is present, though very rudimentary. (I have read somewhere that Esquimaux brought to Broadway, New York City, did not seem alarmed by the

buzzing confusion, but were quite unconcerned until they saw some skins hanging in a furrier's window.)

It seems probable to me that, when a new factor of environment comes into contact with conscious activity, something of the same nature occurs. If it does, it is so quickly connected with memory images and the affective stream that to notice it, even in its cognitive aspect, is almost impossible. For this point of contact with environment, realized at the origin of conscious activity, and again realized over and over, as new factors of environment come into relation with consciousness, I know no better term than "sensation," which may be considered in this connection to include the affective element (*sensitive* means almost anything in the way of perception or affection). When sensation occurs, the sensitive protoplasm delays in its course before responding to a stimulus; a moment passes and it blossoms out into cognition and affection, and is associated with accumulated memory images in the main stream. Sensation, thus considered, would be the bridge between cognition and feeling.

§ 12. New values, therefore, the outcome of

new relations with environment, do not conflict with old values in respect to their origin. But they are modified by old values almost as soon as they appear. If this were not so, but if, on the contrary, new values retained their complete independence, we should be very inconsistent in our views of life. We are that, and it is just because we have systems of value-relations that are more or less isolated one from another that we are so. This inconsistency may be trivial, or it may reach to abnormal proportions where dissociation of personality occurs.

§ 13. So far as value is concerned, we may see that the advantage of a mature consciousness over the earliest stage of consciousness lies in the ability of the former to control new values by means of registered memory-images. This control, I believe, though direct proof would be difficult, also comes about by reference of new affective elements to the affective side of mature conscious activity. But the main control is through ideas; and one chief element of the process of "gaining experience" is learning to control feelings by ideas. The experience of the primitive organism is narrower because the cognitive elements are simpler.

§ 14. A corollary, requiring no proof, is that value-relations with the same objects change according as the objects are found useful in new ways, or as feeling-attitudes toward them change.

§ 15. No proof also is needed for this corollary: Every object with which conscious activity is in relation is of both contributory and immediate value, but there is no constant ratio between the contributory and immediate values which exist by the relation of conscious activity to any one object.

Chapter V may be summarized as follows:

I. Environment.

§ 1. The word "environment" in our discussion will be limited in its use to the surroundings of an animal organism.

§ 2. Environment will designate that part of the world with which an organism comes into direct contact.

§ 3. Whether the contrast between man and his environment is to be thought of wholly from the biological point of view depends upon one's philosophical predisposition.

(a) The materialist and the instrumental

pragmatist preserve the biological point of view intact.

(b) Those who make a difference between the mental and the non-mental may make the contrast psychological, biological, or psychophysical.

(c) Spiritualists would give varying answers, depending upon the degree of "objectivity" which they attribute to the physical world.

§ 4. In man, conscious activity may still be described in terms of the standpoint of the organism without trespassing beyond the biological aspect.

§ 5. This viewpoint is nearest like that of the instrumental pragmatists, with two reservations:

(a) I do not commit myself to a decision as to whether the physical world is certain or uncertain in quantity.

(b) The cognitive aspect of conscious activity must not be minimized.

§ 6. Our use of "environment" is practical, rather than scrupulously exact.

§ 7. In discussing the contrast between man and his environment from the biological point

of view, we must take care not to conceive consciousness as epiphenomenal, or to divide conscious activity into "faculties."

§ 8. Conscious activity is always one in operation, but it has two distinct aspects, one of which is generally more prominent than the other.

§ 9. Conscious activity is related to environment as directly through its feeling-aspect as through cognition. Some practical consequences.

II. Environment and Values.

§ 10. Everything with which conscious activity comes into contact is valuable from both the contributory and the immediate points of view.

§ 11. It is probably true that, both in the case of the origin of conscious activity and in the case of contact of an existing conscious activity with new factors of environment, sensation is the bridge between cognition and feeling.

§ 12. New values do not conflict with old values so far as origin is concerned, but the former are modified by the latter.

§ 13. The advantage of a mature conscious-

ness over the earliest stage of consciousness, so far as value is concerned, is the ability of the former to control new values on the basis of past experience.

§ 14. Value-relations with the same objects change according as the objects are found useful in new ways, or as feeling-attitudes toward them change.

§ 15. Every object with which conscious activity is in relation, is of both contributory and immediate value; but there is no constant ratio between the contributory and immediate values that exist by virtue of the relation of conscious activity to any one object.

PART II

WINDELBAND'S THEORY OF NORMS

CHAPTER VI

SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE

THE terms "subjective" and "objective," applied to values, have provoked much discussion. They may be used in a variety of ways, and a part of the diversity of opinion that prevails among value-philosophers is due to their slippery nature. As values are relations of interest between conscious activity and environment, both consciousness and environment are factors in the experiencing of values. I might think chiefly of the objects valued, and say that all values are objective; or I might think chiefly of my conscious activity which forms or finds values, and say that all values are subjective. There is no room for dispute when the words are used in so general a way.

Correct application of the terms is not so easy, however, if I inquire which term of a value-relation *functions chiefly* in the formation of the relation. I then ask, "What makes a certain object valuable? Is it valuable because

it contains within itself the power to enter into a value-relation? Or is it valuable because my conscious activity has the power to draw it into such a relation? Do I make it valuable, or does it compel me to recognize that it *is* valuable?"

I find objects to be of contributory value when they serve certain ends. They seem to have functions within themselves. A crowbar is good for raising a stone because it has qualities of strength and rigidity that permit of its being used as a lever. Food is good for nourishment because it contains substances which have the ability to replenish energy in animal cells. Such contributory values certainly owe their being to functions of the objects valued, and it is natural to speak of such values as "objective."

Other contributory values have been fixed in an arbitrary way. Save for a general agreement among men, a dollar bill would not be good for the purchase of a certain quantity of a commodity. Here the value of the bill is not inherent in the nature of the piece of paper with a certain form of printing on it; the power of purchase is not a function of the object as such. And yet, when men have agreed that a dollar

bill shall have a definite purchasing value, the power of purchase has become a function of the object. Therefore we may call economic values objective, also.

Judgments were found to be contributory. They have the power of putting those who make them or those who learn them into touch with their environment in such a way that conscious activity makes progress when it judges, as it could not if it did not judge. Judgments, therefore, have functions which they perform. They may also be considered to be objective.

All contributory values may be termed objective. But a question arises when we come to consider immediate values. Are the things that I like, want, demand, and feel-toward, valuable because the things themselves possess the function of satisfying my wants and demands? I like peaches. Now peaches, considered as a food, good for rebuilding bodily tissues, are of contributory value. But there is another kind of value associated with peaches, when I consider simply my liking. I may like them; another person may dislike them. They would serve as wholesome food for each of us. The contributory aspect must not be confused with

another aspect of value, that of my taste for them. Is this taste objective? Do the peaches draw me irresistibly to themselves, or do I go to them because my conscious activity has a peach-loving quality?

Most persons will agree that tastes for certain foods go with the individual, rather than with the object. They will agree that some immediate values are not objective, but subjective. There are certain groups of values, however, which stand in doubt. Is a work of art beautiful because I have a taste that appreciates it, although others might not agree¹ with my taste? Or is it beautiful because it conforms to a norm of beauty quite independent of my taste, and to which I am compelled to give assent? Are certain actions that I contemplate right because I think of them in that way, or because they conform to standards of right that appeal to my conscience?

An analogous question arises in the case of "secondary qualities." Are these objective in the Lockian sense?¹ Or are they, not "powers

¹ Cf. Locke, John, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, II, VIII, § 23: "The power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colors, sounds, smells, tastes, &c."

in the object," but merely the forms in which primary qualities clothe themselves in conscious activity? Of course the answer to this question is quite independent of that to the question whether immediate values are subjective or objective.

Rickert, Windelband, and others believe that not only in the moral and aesthetic spheres, but also in the logical sphere, there are to be found immediate values objective in character. They argue that facts imply judgments, that feeling enters into the determination of facts, and that truth is an objective, logical norm. Some of the inconsistencies of Rickert's position have already been discussed.² The standpoint that recognition of truth is, in the last analysis, independent of inference and perceptual phenomena is of great assistance to those who would argue for the objective character of immediate values in the moral and aesthetic spheres. If it be true that existence is dependent upon knowledge (metaphysics upon epistemology, the Kantian position), reality and "immediate truth" are the same, and the permanent character of the logical norms will argue for the permanent char-

² Chapter II.

acter of norms in other regions. Through much of the following discussion it is impossible not to feel that the battle is often against a ghost that has already been laid — the phantom of Kantian epistemology. And yet, how effectually it has been laid is open to doubt when we read these words of a recent writer: "All that ought to be common property since the days of Kant and Fichte, and every new time only demands a new adjustment of these fundamental insights to the changing knowledge of the period."³

The attractiveness of the position that there are objective immediate values seems to me to lie, not in the support of the theory by Kantian epistemology, but in the facts (1) that the theory sets forth a teleological order of progress and gives permanence to man's ideals, (2) that there is associated with it the conception of a power in nature superior to the blind forces whose outcome is natural selection, (3) that under the theory man is able to take part in world-development, and (4) that conscience and responsibility are explained as directed toward actions that are of more than contingent import.

³ Münsterberg, *The Eternal Values*, 49.

In my endeavor to determine whether there are objective immediate values, I shall choose for careful analysis the work of a representative of the objective point of view. Rickert's treatment of the subject is most acute from the logical standpoint, but it is academic and does not afford the broad outlook of Windelband's. I shall therefore examine Windelband's arguments, as contained in the two essays of "Praeludien," entitled, "Immanuel Kant" ⁴ and "Normen und Naturgesetze." ⁵

⁴ Windelband, Wilhelm, *Immanuel Kant*, in *Praeludien*, 5th ed., 1915, I, 112-146.

⁵ Windelband, Wilhelm, *Normen und Naturgesetze*, *ibid.*, II, 59-98.

CHAPTER VII

THE THEORY OF NORMS

WINDELBAND'S interest in the problem of immediate values is incidental to his interest in the problem of freedom of the will.¹ He seeks a theory which will allow freedom and which, at the same time, will admit within its scope the deterministic forces which operate in nature. The problem of freedom, in turn, is resolved into the problem of the nature of accountability.² Unless we felt that we were accountable for our actions, we should never have the sense of acting freely.

Accountability, according to Windelband, is present not only in the moral field, but also in the fields of thought and feeling.³ In the latter, it is independent of any expectation of reward or punishment, and may there be studied in its purity. One feels that there are commands which one ought to obey, from which, in the actual process of thought and feeling, he often deviates. There is not only a moral conscience,

¹ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 59.

² *Id.*, II, 60.

³ *Id.*, II, 64.

but also a logical and an aesthetic conscience.⁴ Man feels a duty and an obligation to fulfil the commands given him in the three fields. Windelband's explanation of this triple conscience is that it serves a pedagogical purpose⁵ in leading men to follow those rules or norms of thinking, feeling, and willing which are characterized by their inherent importance over all other ways of thinking, willing, and feeling. These rules are *norms* whose realization in human nature we are gradually approaching by a kind of elimination comparable to, but not identical with, the law of natural selection.⁶ The feeling of obligation, or duty, is the push that we receive in the direction of fulfilling a normal demand, the nature of the push being an attraction from the norm itself.⁷ The feeling of accountability arises when we realize that our characters and nothing else are the cause of our thoughts, actions, and feelings, and remorse arises if we feel pain in the knowledge that we could not have acted differently from the way in which we did act.⁸

⁴ *Id.*, II, 67.

⁵ *Id.*, II, 95.

⁶ *Id.*, II, 74.

⁷ *Id.*, II, 80.

⁸ *Id.*, II, 94.

I shall divide my discussion of Windelband's position into a number of sections, as follows:

- I. Kant or Realism?
- II. Evolution and the Norms.
- III. The Parallel between *Denken*, *Fühlen*, and *Wollen*.
- IV. Independence of the Norms from Particular Consciousnesses.
- V. Freedom and Responsibility.

I. KANT OR REALISM?

Windelband, in common with others who defend an objective theory of immediate value, founds his argument on what he believes to be basic principles of philosophy achieved once and for all by the Kantian criticism. The essay *Immanuel Kant* is in praise of Kant's critical view over the older Greek view of knowledge as a subject-object relation. In statement of my view, I cannot do better than to refer again to the essay *The Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epistemology*, by Walter T. Marvin, in *The New Realism*.⁹ The particular portion of Marvin's argument which I wish to employ in

⁹ *The New Realism*, New York, 1912, pp. 43-95.

my criticism of Windelband is that expressed in the title of the fourth chapter of his essay, "Epistemology does not give, but presupposes, a theory of reality."

The argument of Marvin is with reference to the whole Kantian epistemology. I wish to show, however, that, after accepting the Kantian standpoint, Windelband does not keep to it consistently, but places the norms against a realistic background.

§ 1. In the essay *Immanuel Kant*,¹⁰ he says, "The truth is that Kant has defined as the problem of philosophy reflection on the basis of the principles of Reason, i.e., the absolute norms, and that this reflection, far from being exhausted by the rules of thinking, only finds its conclusion through the rules of willing and feeling." This is to say that the frame in which our experience is cast consists of norms of willing and feeling as well as norms of thinking. Taken all together, the norms constitute the rules of all possible experience.

In the essay *Normen und Naturgesetze*, however, we find quite a different conception of norms. Here¹¹ Windelband contrasts the laws

¹⁰ Windelband, *Praeludien*, I, 141.

¹¹ *Id.*, II, 72.

of nature with the norms. Having previously defined laws of nature in Kantian fashion as "those general judgments about the succession of psychical events, in which we recognize the existence of psychical activity, and from which we are able to derive the separate facts of the psychical life,"¹² he speaks of the operation of the norms as only partly identical with the operation of the laws of nature.¹³ He says:

All norms are thus special forms of the realization of natural laws. The system of norms represents a *selection* out of the infinite manifoldness of the forms of combination under which, according to the individual circumstances, the natural laws of the psychical life can unfold themselves. The laws of logic are a selection from the possible forms of the association of ideas; the laws of ethics are a selection from the possible forms of motivation; the laws of aesthetics are a selection from the possible forms of feeling activity.

In this essay, norms appear as a *selection* from a manifold of possible — and actual — experiences; in the former essay, they are *the conditions of any possible experience at all*. This change of viewpoint, however, necessitates drop-

¹² Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 65.

¹³ *Id.*, II, 72.

ping the Kantian conception of norms as the framework of all possible experience, and shifting the conception to that of norms operating against a background of laws of nature.

§ 2. Windelband might regard the laws of nature as the Kantian framework and the norms as additional laws existing together with them and exerting a selective influence which is felt in the individual through the triple conscience. In point of fact, however, he steadfastly regards the norms as identical with the Kantian "*Regeln*." His treatment brings out the difficulty of the Kantian position in the matter of defining truth. Where reality is simply the experienced, the conception of a mechanistic regulation must work equally well in false as in true judgments. And where *Regeln* of willing and feeling are united with those of thinking, as conditions of possible experience, "truth" is applied to all experience (in some way). Windelband says, "Thus, in the greatest philosophers, science recognizes by her side the ethical and the aesthetic sense as determining factors of the highest truth."¹⁴ Truth here is considered to have epistemological reference to all

¹⁴ *Id.*, I, 141.

the elements of experience. In the other essay, however, it is the logical norms alone which have the "*Zweck der Wahrheit*."¹⁵ It is again evident that the possible content of experience is here thought of as consisting of more than the *known*.

§ 3. The difficulty of Windelband's theory of norms in its relation to the Kantian *Regeln* is also brought out in his discussion of the independence of the norms from particular consciousnesses.¹⁶ He is right in his thesis that it is not necessary for the individual in whom the norms are working to be aware of the fact, if the norms are Kantian *Regeln*; but how will they be any more present if the individual *is* conscious of them? It is not the consciousness or the lack of consciousness of the norms that primarily causes the trouble, but the position that there can be *degrees* of presence, or, rather, that there can ever be absence. The difficulty of the Kantian position in general in explaining why it is that the *Regeln* are consciously present as *Regeln* to so few persons is a different objection — one that is discussed by A. J. Balfour in

¹⁵ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 84.

¹⁶ *Id.*, I, 83.

A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, Chapter VI. To say that norms exist independently of any particular consciousness, in the full sense of independence, would be Kantian suicide.

The considerations which I have adduced seem to me to make it evident that Windelband has at least unconsciously modified the Kantian position in his treatment of norms. He seems to adopt a position of "naive realism"; the norms and the laws of nature must work together in reality. In giving up the full Kantian point of view, Windelband's theory loses some of the plausibility that it gained when the norms were presented in the guise of epistemological necessity, but the theory remains an attractive one. We are now compelled to assume that norms have a metaphysical existence; and, once this is done, there is always the possibility of a pre-established harmony between the psychic and the cosmic processes. I am not sure whether such a possibility can be disproved. The safe line of argument, the one adopted here, is to show that, unless the assumption of the metaphysical existence of norms is made at the start, the arguments advanced to establish that existence fail.

II. EVOLUTION AND THE NORMS

§ 4. Windelband assumes that the world is actually the world that science describes to us. It has objective being; the law of causation is its binding principle. It is a deterministic universe in the sense that the causal series described by science is the actual one and the only one possible. The causal sequence of nature tends to become known to man by natural processes. Man is able to observe, and to infer the nature of the factors of evolution which have led to the present result.

Especially conspicuous to man is the inequality which exists between the factors of evolution. The development of the whole is purposive in the direction of the triumph of the most weighty factors. Nature is conceived as a mass of activities of which some few are destined to survive, either because of their fitness in the struggle for existence (by natural selection) or because of their inherent importance. Windelband observes that some of the psychical factors which are of inherent importance also aid in the struggle for existence, as for example, cleverness, and the transcendental laws of thought.¹⁷ But he notes that others, such as

the moral and aesthetic factors, are of indifferent value in the struggle for existence and are often positively detrimental. He accounts for their persistence by saying that they must have an inherent importance.¹⁷ A distinction between factors of quantitative importance in the physical world and norms of qualitative importance in the psychical world would bring out Windelband's meaning.

Strictly speaking, the comparison between physical and psychical factors in evolution is not a parallel. The world is a unity, and the field of struggle the same for each group of factors. (The unity here is the fact that there is only *one* evolution in the physical world.) The working out of the causal process produces a great variety of organisms and psychical characters. The important characters become fixed gradually by the weeding out of the others. The wide variation in importance between the different characters necessitates the elimination of the less important characters. Saying that there is a difference of "importance" is expressed in another way by saying that nature is purposeful in developing certain characters

¹⁷ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 76 ff.

¹⁸ *Id.*, II, 80.

at the expense of certain others. These important factors, as we have seen, are of a different nature in the physical and psychical worlds.

The most pregnant criticism of such a view of evolution lies in a consideration of its workability. The difficulty rests in the incompatibility of two sets of factors: factors whose survival-value is determined by their quantitative strength, and factors whose importance is due to a qualitative intensity. Windelband observes that, at the present stage of evolution, these factors are often in opposition, and, one may ask, what hope is there of a reconciliation? Sooner or later there must be a reckoning; and, judging from the fact that the realization of psychical factors is dependent upon the presence of favorable physical processes, we should infer that, no matter how qualitatively important the psychical factors may be, the latter will always be at the mercy of the former. The persistence of psychical development up to the present time argues for its persistence and co-existence with the physical in the future; but Windelband needs to show by what natural process the realization of the norms is assured. "Inherent importance" is insufficient.

To me it seems that it makes no difference how closely the two sets of factors may be associated. A particular case of "right-and-its-circumstances" would, under the theory, have a greater survival-value than other groups of circumstances not containing "right." But it is not conceivable that the circumstances associated with right should always contain quantitative factoral preëminence. Therefore, it would have to be the qualitative factor often that effected the survival-value, and there would be bound to be the clash between quantitative and qualitative factors which I have described.

III. THE PARALLEL BETWEEN *DENKEN*, *FÜHLEN*, AND *WOLLEN*

A. THE PARALLEL BETWEEN *DENKEN* AND *WOLLEN*

§ 5. Windelband says that, just as in *Denken* there is but one correct thought, so in *Wollen* there is but one right action.¹⁹ This, however, is no true parallel. "Thing-to-be-thought" is made parallel with "moral decision"; the true parallel would be between "thing-to-be-thought"

¹⁹ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 63 ff.

and "thing-to-be-done." But there is never one objective action which is right independently of the doer; there is no right or wrong with reference to the *matter* of moral decision. Buying two \$5 seats at the opera is not right or wrong in itself, but for a particular person under particular circumstances.

The fault of the parallel is in the supposition that there is the same possibility of latitude in thought as in action. We should be *obliged* to think according to the Kantian norms, if they exist. Parallel with such norms would be norms of willing which would compel us to act in ways regulated by them. In either case there is no choice open to us, no case where the norms might *not* operate.

The Kantian epistemology has no place for incorrect thinking. According to it, objects of consciousness are particular groupings of empirical representations according to the laws of the understanding. Incorrect thinking, according to some of Kant's followers, is unclear arrangement of our perceptions. I ask whether, when we are compelled to make a moral decision, of the various alternatives presented, one, the moral, attracts us because it is so much clearer than any other?

§ 6. Windelband's theory, in that it assures independence of one another to the several series of norms, unwarrantably isolates cognition, feeling, and will. Thought, aesthetic feeling, and moral decision may well be taken as types of highest development of these "faculties"; but, even in their highest development, they can never become independent. The grounds of this objection are found in two considerations. (a) Windelband speaks of truth as the "end" of thought. "End," however, is a word used properly only where activity is present. As long as there is thought-activity, so long must the active (will) element be associated with the cognitive. Complete disassociation would be possible only in the case of absolute passivity of thought, a condition which would be indistinguishable from unconsciousness. (b) If the norms of moral decision were independent of those of cognition, we should have a situation where moral laws were present without any matter on which they might act; *or* the matter of moral decisions would be that of empirical representations. The former supposition is absurd; under the latter, it would be necessary for the perceptions to be arranged

in consciousness according to the laws of the understanding, before they could be of service for moral decision. In such a case, the norms of morality would be dependent on the logical norms.

B. THE RELATION OF *FÜHLEN* TO *DENKEN* AND *WOLLEN*

I shall discuss this portion of the subject together with the following section.

IV. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE NORMS OF PARTICULAR CON- SCIOUSNESSES

Windelband constantly writes as if he believed that the norms were operating in a world of matter and motion. This presupposition leads him to try to prove that they exist quite independently of particular consciousnesses.²⁰ In his proof, he makes much of the very portion of the Kantian position which has been assailed most vigorously, namely, the varying degree to which the norms are present to the consciousness of individuals. The fact that most men have but a hazy idea of norms of truth, beauty,

²⁰ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 81 ff.

and morality is taken to argue for independent, objective existence. Before presenting Windelband's arguments, it may be asked whether the independent, objective existence of norms which may at one time not be present to the consciousness of a particular individual, and again at another time *may* be present, does not presuppose that there are objective entities which may pass to and from the knowing situation? And if so, is not this to take away from consciousness the sole privilege of organizing the material of empirical representations? Does not this lead to realism?

A. SINGLE LAWS OF LOGIC, MORALITY, AND BEAUTY

It is argued that the norms, when actualized, exist independently of the consciousness in which the actualization occurs. Windelband presents two proofs, the one based on our judgment of their actualization in others, the other derived from our appreciation of their actualization in ourselves.

§ 7. Norms are independent of the consciousness of the one in whom they are actualized because we give our approval or disapproval to

such a one whether or not he is conscious of such a realization in himself.²¹

This argument is most plausible in the case of *Denken*. If we assume a realistic background and the current presuppositions of science, we think of facts and the relations between facts as quite valid no matter whether there exist any perceiving consciousness at all. If we superimpose an idealistic epistemology, we still grant that the existence of a stable world stands or falls by the constancy and similarity of factual impressions.

The case of *Wollen*, however, is different. That we are loath to give actions independent of conscious moral decision any ethical value so far as the agent is concerned, is shown by the fact that we do not grant that such actions have moral merit. Our praise or blame in such cases is the result of comparison with our own standards. Without this comparison, there would be no "beautiful souls" who act morally from nature. I do not mean that, if the absolute value of our own moral standards be granted, such "souls" are not beautiful, but that, without recognition of their beauty by us, they would

²¹ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 81.

have no moral value whatever. It is useless for Windelband to show that moral actions may be independent of the consciousness of the agent, unless he can also show that they are independent of the consciousness of others at the same time. And what we assume as to independent existence in the case of the objects of thought, is insuperably difficult if applied to the case of moral laws, where divergence of opinion is so wide. Without any implication that moral laws and aesthetic judgments stand upon a similar basis, we may say that the same argument applies equally well to the consideration of unconscious creation of beauty.

§ 8. Some norms may excite approval or disapproval in the consciousness of the agent upon realization, without their actually being present to his consciousness.²²

We can create a beautiful object or appreciate a work of art without thinking of aesthetic norms, which are rules of criticism. This is very true. But in his desire to avoid a subjectivistic basis of logic and ethic, Windelband has overreached himself a little in applying the same arguments to aesthetic. In the case of

²² *Id.*, II, 83.

aesthetic judgments, there is a simple explanation of the phenomenon which he mentions, which entirely obviates the necessity of attributing independence of consciousness to the norms. According to this view, aesthetic pleasure originates only when a cognitive element of consciousness stresses one aspect of feeling over other aspects. The more attention that is paid to special features of the object appreciated, and the more these special features are associated with other ideas in the mind, the greater the development of aesthetic feeling. Aesthetic rules may be formed upon introspection, but they are merely the coming to self-consciousness of cognitive elements which were already present, although so tied up with the feeling elements that they were not separately recognized. Of course we do not need to have rules in order to feel beauty. Rules are the outcome of reflection over shades of feeling. But it is also true that the study of some aesthetic system will aid very materially in later combinations of cognition and feeling in aesthetic appreciation. One is not born a composer of beautiful music. No matter what may be the extent of the gift of musical feeling, it

is necessary that the cognitive elements of harmony be learned by hearing good music in which the harmony is present, and generally by a study of theory. Beethoven, born on an island where no music was ever heard, would likely have beaten a drum.

In the case of aesthetic feeling, Windelband argued from the truth that artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation do not demand consciousness of norms of beauty. But this apparent independence does not hold true of logical and moral norms, as Windelband himself admits. Here, he says, the norms are concerned with the "deciding moment" ²³ in the process, and so are of the very greatest value to the consciousness of the agent. We are not likely to perform a moral act, unless we are conscious of a standard of morality in deference to which we choose to act in one way rather than in another!

B. REALMS OF LAWS OF LOGIC, MORALITY, AND BEAUTY

It may be objected, in reply to my criticism of Windelband's parallel between *Denken*, *Fühlen*, and *Wollen*, that it is difficult to demonstrate

²³ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 84.

parallelism between single laws of thought, single moral decisions, and single appreciations of beauty; but that it would be easier to defend the existence of three realms of laws of logic, morality, and beauty. Perhaps the inconsistency of the parallel is only apparent, and results from a different kind of relation of each of the realms to an individual, rather than from the point of view of the three realms themselves.

It is puzzling to know how we are to conceive the three realms of norms. In what does their objectivity consist? If we adopt the Kantian standpoint, we might consider a moral norm objective in the same sense that the laws of the understanding are objective. The moral norm in question would accompany the logical laws by which the whole situation is conceived, and the whole would be a "right-situation." But this objectivity would not be ontological, but epistemological.

From the standpoint of realism, it is possible to assume that there is a pre-established harmony between the psychological recognition of a right action and an objective "right" inherent in a teleological universe — however the inherent "right" may collide at times with fac-

tors of natural selection. This position, however, is one that Windelband does not adopt. He is anxious to put the norms on the same footing with the laws of nature, and makes his appeal to the Kantian standpoint.

§ 9. In order to show that there are three realms of norms influencing the logical, moral, and aesthetic "faculties" of man, it is necessary to demonstrate that there is a choice presented, and that the norms point toward an action, thought, or feeling which would not be indicated clearly without them. Windelband's effort to prove the existence of such a choice is made in connection with his attempted demonstration of a moral, a logical, and an aesthetic conscience, and with his belief that the factors operating in natural selection are inadequate to explain the facts.

(a) He claims that the existence of a moral conscience in *individuals* cannot be accounted for by the law of survival.²⁴ For, he says, in order to effect a moral purpose, a man can use only a *part* of the means at his disposal. Other possible actions are forbidden him. Furthermore, the older a civilization grows, the less

²⁴ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 77.

moral it becomes, a fact which shows that natural selection does not operate here in choosing a factor of permanent advantage.²⁵ But he says that in the case of *nations* the moral value is identical with the survival value.

It seems to me that this argument overlooks a whole field of inquiry, in which moral conscience has been described in wholly psychological terms. Man became conscious of actions that were at first instinctive, and the memory of previous actions furnished circumstances to be considered by the side of later actions. Compare, for example, J. S. Mill's description of conscience.²⁶ This theory is strengthened in consideration of the fact that consciences are so different, resting as they do upon different psychological equipments. Moral conscience would seem to be a very imperfect instrument whose function it is to indicate our needs with reference to action. It would be easier to argue for metaphysical objectivity, if we found more uniformity in moral consciences. Moral laws, framed at first in accordance with instincts, might well have been possessed of survival value

²⁵ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 79.

²⁶ Mill, J. S., *Utilitarianism*, Everyman ed., New York, 1910, p. 26.

for primitive man. Windelband seems to be under the impression that survival-values, to be such, must be operative through the whole of their existence — which is not true.

(*b*) Moreover, Windelband's argument by the use of the term "moral decision" is faulty. When we speak of moral decision, we have emerged from the strictly psychological field of inquiry into the logical field. Moral decision, however quickly we may make it, is a matter of judgment. Moral choice is the outcome of deliberation (Aristotle). In his discussion of conscience in evolution and moral decision, it seems to me that Windelband has deviated from the point at issue. We are trying to determine whether there is ontological objectivity in an action that is *felt* as right. Moral decision, brought about by standards of right, the outcome of education, is concerned with mediate, not immediate values. If there are such ontological entities as moral norms, they must operate immediately, in the case of felt right; as, for instance, when I feel that such and such an action is right in itself.

Now when I become introspective, I do not find any feeling of conscience immediately in-

clining me to a way of acting. I find no actions which seem right or wrong in themselves. In every case where conscience enters, I find that I have been weighing possible actions, however brief may have been the process. I find myself discriminating between different interests. Therefore, I cannot help concluding that actions in themselves are indifferent, and that moral distinctions are mediate. It is true that I am inclined to follow instincts, but I cannot find any moral quality as distinguished from instinct. I may say that moral distinctions grew out of my instincts, but nothing leads me to suppose that the distinctions themselves are anything but derivative. And, inasmuch as actions are meaningless from the standpoint of morality, when divorced from choice and deliberation, I conclude that the ontological objectivity of moral norms can only be defended by the supposition of a pre-established harmony.

§ 10. Windelband says that logical norms lead us to truth.²⁷ Now from the Kantian standpoint this position is more easily defended than from that of realism. If logical laws and physical phenomena are all considered epistemo-

²⁷ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 84.

logically, one may be objective in the same sense as the other. There is some difficulty in discovering any epistemological falsity at all, however, for everything just *is*.

But Windelband uses the Kantian argument to make his position plausible at the start. Then he switches over to the Lockian conception of knowledge as *true* knowledge. According to the latter conception, he thinks of the psychological processes as having a great number of possibilities of association of "ideas" in various ways in any one situation. That which leads the mind to prefer one over all the other possibilities is the quality of normality which it possesses. Thus the norms of thought are neither identical with nor contrary to the general laws of association of ideas. I do not see how we can admit these possibilities of association if we keep to the Kantian standpoint. According to Kant, we *have* to think according to these laws. I repeat, the position of Windelband here is more in accord with Locke, and we must consider the matter in connection with the implied realistic background.

Where is truth? If it is the real as the object of judgment, as the realists tell us, I cannot see

where logical norms are demanded. In such a case, we should be led to truth simply by what, in the last analysis, is perception — of objects and relations. To suppose the existence of norms would be to believe that there is a special conspiracy on the part of nature to bring organic beings into harmony with it from their psychological standpoint. From the standpoint of evolution this would be a *hysteron proteron*; and it would render natural selection useless. If, on the other hand, truth is in the judgment, it would seem to be mediate, insofar as there is presented the possibility of a number of judgments. But a logical truth of this kind, based on inference, is something quite different from immediate approval of a correct thought. And logical truth ultimately traces back to perceptual phenomena, unless an idealistic complication is introduced. I cannot, therefore, see the necessity of supposing ontologically objective norms of thinking. Epistemologically, they may be defended (with a problem as to the nature of the false idea).

§ 11. The strongest argument for ontological objectivity is found in the case of so-called aesthetic norms. We recall James's discussion of the place of affectional facts.²⁸ Beauty, as

²⁸ James, William, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, 137-154.

well as color and secondary qualities in general, can be thought of as a quality of the object. A beautiful vase so functions as to produce a feeling of immediate pleasure. I cannot prove that the beauty is entirely subjective any more than I can prove that secondary, or even primary, qualities are entirely subjective. The pleasure of beauty may be only incidental. Why, then, does it seem more reasonable, according to my view, to consider the beauty as wholly psychological?

Windelband says that one reason for considering aesthetic norms objective is the fact that aesthetic appreciations cannot be accounted for on the basis of their survival by a process of natural selection.²⁹ He implies that there would be no need of supposing the existence of these norms, if such an account could be given. He says that, although it is true that there has been a gradual development of the nervous system in the case of organic nature, it is also true that the over-development of aesthetic ability is apt to be weakening, rather than strengthening.

Now it seems to me that the preservation of aesthetic capabilities may be accounted for by

²⁹ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 79.

natural selection. It has been observed that our aesthetic appreciations and our laws of beauty follow closely along the line of the structure of natural objects. Those organisms which harmonized with their environment would tend to survive. This would not preclude the possibility of later aesthetic development beyond the point of usefulness of the aesthetic factor as a survival value. A quite theoretical volume of appreciations might survive, for evolution casts off only dangerous developments, not harmless ones. If over-refinement led to weakness, the survival-value would assert itself on occasion.

The primitive colors carry with them more aesthetic delight to an uncultured people than the more delicate shades. The rare colors give pleasure only to the "highbrow." Primitive colors, furthermore, are associated with many objects which have survival-reference. The warm colors, yellow and red, have pleasure associated with them perhaps because of their connection with the light of the sun and the warmth of fires. Cold blue is associated with the sea and sky; black, with the treacherous night. Observe, too, that the same object of appreciation may affect different individuals in

wholly different ways. The general uniformity of taste may be accounted for on the principle of harmony of organic with inorganic nature.

Even so, beauty might be considered to be ontologically objective. In such a case, nature would have to be regarded as conspiring to give aesthetic pleasure to some of its organic components. Beauty, to be ontologically objective, must be a principle in nature distinct from the utility which operates in natural selection; that is, it must be so, if we are ever to prove its existence, for, of course, we might have faith in eternal beauty without the least bit of evidence to prove that it exists. However, the psychological explanation seems to me to be entirely adequate, and the proofs advanced to establish an over-personal beauty seem inconclusive. Therefore, it seems wisest to adhere to the simpler viewpoint.

V. FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

§ 12. After having attempted to show how norms and natural laws may fit into a single system, Windelband seeks to remove the Kantian dualism of a region of freedom and a region of natural law. His method is a consideration of

the meaning of freedom. He aims to show that freedom and determinism are not incompatible. He says,

Freedom is the determination of the empirical consciousness by consciousness of the norm. . . . This freedom is in no wise a mysterious ability to do something for which no cause is present; it demands no exception to the continuity determined by nature of the phenomena of the life of the soul; but it is rather the ripest product of natural necessity, that through which the empirical consciousness places itself under the law of the consciousness of the norm.³⁰

Aside from the notion of norms, I find myself in cordial agreement with Windelband in his contention that freedom and determinism are not incompatible. But Windelband seems to feel that norms somehow help to a reconciliation, and in this I cannot agree with him. He seems to feel that freedom can be explained as a type of determination according to norms. It appears to me that nature is here regarded as static before possibilities of determination, on the one hand, according to quantitative factors of evolution, and, on the other, according to

³⁰ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 88.

normal, qualitative factors. Now if the Kantian dualism is to disappear, it seems most natural that quantitative and normal factors should work themselves out in a single system along deterministic lines. The theory, however, shows no reason why normal factors should prevail. This was my first criticism of norms, here repeated with special reference to the discussion of freedom.

I do not think that the reader of Windelband's arguments will be satisfied with his definition of freedom after a consideration of his subsequent discussion. Windelband escapes the main problem of freedom by identifying freedom with a certain kind of determined *processes*. A human being cannot act outside of natural law in the carrying out of any plan. The means at his disposal are determined from the start; and, if he follows out a certain course of action, there is a chain of causation to whose links he must conform. When Windelband places freedom in a course of action determined according to consciousness of a norm, he appears to place it right in the causal series.

It may be seen, however, that the issue does not lie here. Windelband speaks of the em-

pirical consciousness "placing itself" (*sich stellt*) under the law of consciousness of the norm. In the next sentence he defines freedom as the "autonomy" with which the individual consciousness makes of a norm, known and recognized by it, a maxim of action. Now this autonomy by which the individual consciousness is able to put itself under the determination of one of several possible courses of action is a different sort of freedom from that of the preceding definition of freedom as the "determination of the empirical consciousness through the consciousness of the norm." In the case of the definition just quoted, nature is viewed as a battlefield wherein different laws, natural and normal, come into collision. The natural laws war among themselves, and the issue is decided by natural selection. The addition of norms to the *forms* of the evolution-process merely increases the number of laws which are at war. Now I take it that there are degrees of power among the factors of evolution, and that these degrees of importance are constant throughout the process of nature, so that there results a causal continuity.

By Windelband's first definition, freedom

would consist in the consciousness of the transference of the action of an individual from one type of mechanistic series to another type of mechanistic series. "Freedom is nothing other than the consciousness of this determining power which the known and recognized norm is able to exercise over the thinking faculty and decision of the will." I interpret this to mean that norms are laws which exist only in relation to conscious beings; that natural laws reign supreme in inorganic nature; but that the individual conscious being is able to escape from the tyranny of an implacable mechanism by placing himself under the rule of higher laws which become operative only through the medium of consciousness. Now the important idea of this exposition is that consciousness makes a difference in the deterministic course of nature. Certain laws, norms, become operative only when organisms become conscious of them. It is difficult, however, to see how awareness of norms, however influential a factor it may be, can itself be termed freedom, on the plea that this factor of awareness initiates certain new deterministic lines. The awareness simply becomes one new factor. This fits in

well with the argument for determinism, but it ill accords with the admission of freedom. Freedom seems to have become identified with a process of awareness.

The plausibility of Windelband's argument seems to lie in the implicit assumption of another kind of freedom for the individual in addition to the one which he has defined. This second kind of freedom is expressed by his use of the words "autonomy" and "places itself." Freedom, according to this second conception, is something within the factor of awareness, not identical with it. Freedom is the ability of one who is aware to accept or reject the normal way of acting. Decision of the will is a decision involving choice of action on the part of the one who is aware. I do not feel that Windelband has escaped the real problem of freedom by the method which he has employed. The old discussion of whether the will is free comes again to the fore; it has been buried only temporarily. How can a conscious being "place himself" under the rule of one of several kingdoms of law? Windelband's only implied answer is, "Through being conscious." He seems to feel that it is the peculiar glory of a conscious being

to be able to make selective choice of factors which shall govern his action. He seems to feel that, by making norms part of a determined system, he has made freedom intelligible. But the real dispute, it seems to me, is not over the question as to how courses of action work out (as, for instance, whether or not they are in causal series), but over how the individual is able to choose one course of action rather than another, it being taken for granted that any course is determined *in the process*. And I cannot see how the introduction of norms helps the situation at all. It only adds a complication to the factorial-complex of possible actions—about whose possibility it is mainly disputed.

This is no essay on determinism, indeterminism, and freedom, but a discussion of the relation of Windelband's conception of norms to his conception of freedom. I think that it has been shown that the assumption of norms only embarrasses the discussion, and that without norms we can as easily suppose several courses of possible action, any one of which may be completely determined *in the process*. There is nothing to be gained by printing one of these courses of action in red letters!

Windelband fears that his notion of freedom will be challenged on the ground that it does not do justice to the feeling of responsibility and to the existence of responsibility in general.³¹ He feels it important, therefore, to examine the notion of responsibility. As he has been trying to reconcile the concept of freedom with some kind of determinism, it is not necessary to reconcile responsibility with his theory of determination by norms. He feels that the crux of the question lies in the admission that acts of moral decision are *caused*. But, at the outset, he finds that causation and responsibility are not incompatible. In fact, if moral actions were not caused, there could be no responsibility; all would be mere chance. We are only responsible when *we* cause our actions. Wherein, then, lies our feeling of repugnance in the matter of making responsibility contain causation? Windelband feels that it lies in the notion of *necessity* which we must attribute to cause and effect, if causation is to have any "objective character." He proceeds to analyze the concept of necessity (as distinguished from the time-relation of succession, discussed by Hume)

³¹ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 88.

into two meanings. One of these, the meaning of *Wirksam*, "power," is not further discussed. The other is said to be that of logical dependence of the special on the general, *Gesetzmässigkeit*, "according-to-lawness."³² Now our repugnance in the matter of admitting causation into the conception of responsibility is evidently a feeling that *Gesetzmässigkeit* destroys freedom. Windelband quotes the work of Rickert in connection with the analysis of *Ursächlichkeit*, to the effect that many acts which are caused do not have a general law behind them. Such are all individual actions which never recur under exactly the same conditions. Therefore, *Gesetzmässigkeit* and *Ursächlichkeit* are not co-extensive; and, if this be true, responsibility would sometimes have to do with causal relations which are not predetermined according to a general law. Windelband does not examine Rickert's arguments, but passes to a consideration as to where one finds the idea of necessary connection in the case of unique actions. He says that a man's willing and acting are caused by his character.³³ The obedience to law in the

³² *Id.*, II, 90.

³³ *Id.*, II, 92.

case of unique actions is found in the nature of character which sets forth a logical law of general nature; viz., if the circumstances were to be repeated (whether they are actually repeated or not), the man would act thus and so. Thus, "all effecting (*Wirksamkeit*) has epistemological meaning, and the logical form of *Gesetzmässigkeit*, even if its factual non-repetition or inability to be repeated excludes methodologically its comparison with other examples."³⁴ Therefore, the causal relation is never present without *Gesetzmässigkeit*, even if this be only epistemological.

It is somewhat puzzling to gather the precise significance which Windelband wishes us to attach to his analysis of causation. If Rickert's position were sound, causation would be relieved of some of the burden imposed on it by determinism; and responsibility would be affected similarly by a softening of the conception of causality. Windelband, however, feels the need of retaining the notion of necessary connection in some sense, and he endeavors to soften the sense of *Gesetzmässigkeit*. This he does by showing that, in cases of unique action, obedi-

³⁴ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 92.

ence to law is only to be understood epistemologically. Supporting himself on the Kantian epistemology, Windelband is able to juggle terms between the laws of phenomena and logical laws, with an ontological implication that, as the one realm is as real as the other, it is permissible to take from each in building up a theory.

My criticism of the analysis of causation is that it is not to the point. It is certainly true that the causal relation exists between the act of moral decision and the subsequent action that is carried out, but the question is as to whether the causal relation exists between the norm and the act of decision. We may represent the matter more clearly by the use of symbols. Let n stand for norm, b for the act of moral decision of a conscious being, c for the subsequent action, R for relation, and C for causal. Now my position is that responsibility certainly involves $b-RC-c$. This is well established by Windelband. The important question, however, is not what kind of causal relation this may be, but whether there is another causal relation between n and b ; is $n-RC-b$ true, in other words? Windelband escapes consideration of this problem by using the ambiguous term "character"

to cover both the norm and the act of decision, *nb*. He thinks that the difficulty connected with causation is settled by showing that $nb \text{---} RC \text{---} c$. But the matter is not settled by saying that "character determines willing and acting." He proves that an act of moral decision determines a subsequent action, by virtue of the "character" of the agent, and then assumes that there is no question as to determination *within* "character," which contains at least the important elements of the act of moral decision and the presence of the norm.

The point at issue is, Does the presence of the norm in the "character" determine the act of decision? This question can not be discussed without coming dangerously near assuming the discarded notion of "states of consciousness." A more psychological statement of the point at issue would be, Has a conscious being ability to reject or accept or choose between conscious impulses? *This* is the question whose answer is the answer as to whether man has freedom or not.

This question is discussed subsequently by Windelband, and I shall criticize his treatment of it. He says that another objection brought

against the association of responsibility with causal necessity in the case of willing and acting, is the fact that, by popular usage, responsibility always implies the belief that a man could have acted otherwise than he really did act.³⁵ Whereupon Windelband answers that the possibility of a variety of actions in a situation is true only of man "*in abstracto*"; that a man "*in concreto*" could act otherwise only if he *were* otherwise. It is because his character is such as it is and because it has caused certain actions that we judge a man responsible for what he has done.

Windelband here expressly denies that a man has any choice of possible actions. With it he implies that a man has no choice of possible *decisions*. The latter denial, to my mind, is the denial of the only kind of freedom that is worth anything. Observe two things. Note the confusion running through the argument with respect to willing and acting. Windelband's original discussion had to do with the parallel between *Denken*, *Wollen*, and *Fühlen*. Now, when he is temporarily discussing *Wollen* alone, a stranger has made his appearance,

³⁵ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 93.

Handeln. We now read of *Wollen* and *Handeln*. They are spoken of in the same breath, and it is just because of this juxtaposition that Windelband can profit by his confusion between an act of decision of the will (*Wollen*) and the physical process (*Handeln*) which follows the act of decision.

Observe, in the second place, that responsibility as interpreted by Windelband is here brought in to *prove* that a man has no choice of possible actions. This goes well if we take it literally: a man can be responsible only for a causally determined *action*. But how can he be responsible for an act of decision if it be causally determined? If an act of decision of the will is the effect of a determining cause, responsibility for the decision must rest with the cause, not with the man himself.

Windelband has said that a man cannot act otherwise than is determined by his character. His proof, as we have seen, relies upon use of the term "character" in an ambiguous sense. The difficulty in the matter of application of responsibility to the cause is now discussed by him as a new difficulty. He now asks, What is responsible for the character: circumstances,

society, or God? How can the individual be responsible for his character? "*Als ob es noch irgendwie auszudenken wäre, was das Individuum im Unterschiede von seinem Charakter noch sein könnte!*"³⁶ In such a case, Windelband says, a man's character would have to be doubled; he would have to have an empirical and an intelligible character, and thus we should have a metaphysical conception which would not agree with the causal element of the conception of responsibility. Windelband's solution is to locate responsibility in the judgment whereby we transfer our approval or disapproval of a *function* to the individual who functions.³⁷

Windelband's main problem was to reconcile freedom with determinism. He found that, in order to do so, he would have to give an account of responsibility which would do full justice to it. His method was to show that causation and responsibility are not incompatible. We should suppose that he would find responsibility somewhere in the series of causation, but he discovers that the problem of infinite regress is involved. He therefore concludes that, although causation in moral action is always associated with respon-

³⁶ Windelband, *Praeludien*, II, 94. ³⁷ *Id.*, II, 95.

sibility, responsibility is only applied metaphorically to the *person*; that it is only a way of *passing judgment* on a portion of the causal series; that itself it is not a part of the causal series at all. How does this agree with Windelband's method of showing that responsibility is not incompatible with determinism by norms on the ground that responsibility always *involves* the notion of causation? If this notion of causation is found ultimately to be of only metaphorical application, has the objection to Windelband's definition of freedom been removed by the location of a *metaphorical* causation in responsibility?

As to his objection that a man's character would have to be doubled in order to make it possible for him to change his character, I would reply that there is no more a problem here than there is in the *facts* that a conscious being preserves the memory of former experiences, or that one can make a judgment of approval or disapproval. The problem is contained in the question as to whether he can ever decide in favor of the less prominent factor.

Windelband, as we have seen, has finally located responsibility in the judgment, and he

believes that it is a great pedagogical means of getting oneself and others into the way of obedience to norms. These laws, by their "inherent importance," are destined ultimately to prevail, and responsibility is one factor in the process by which they reach supremacy in the lives of individuals. If it were not for Windelband's application of the term "responsibility" to persons rather than to functions, I should be inclined to suppose that responsibility, like norms, was taken to be one more factor in the evolutionary process. He may, indeed, regard it in this light. Judgments, then, would be determined, and we should have here simply a case of a very pragmatic function of the intellect in cooperation with the rest of the order of nature. But the memory of Windelband's use of the expressions "autonomy" and "places itself," together with his apparent belief that responsibility is not entirely a delusive thing, leads me to wonder whether he does not, in effect, locate freedom in the judgment. Does he not assume (though it is out of harmony with his arguments) that we can approve or disapprove according to our will, and that we can put ourselves under the rule of one or another set of factors? That we

can teach others by our exercise of judgment of their actions? That we can do this in some real sense and not merely in conformity with a causal process?

Unless something of this sort is felt by Windelband, I cannot see how the ethical significance of his doctrine is other than "*laissez faire*." If we have no real ability to bring the norms to bear on our lives and the lives of others, but just take part in the whole process of evolution, with responsibility as a natural phenomenon at work with the other factors, responsibility can be no more than a very involuntary pedagogical instrument, and the less mankind knows about Windelband's theory the better — that is, if it is not true!

Windelband's general position is characterized by passivity on the part of the individual to the forces which shape the course of development of body and mind. To be sure, he defends moral decision, and describes man as struggling upward, but the more powerful the attraction from the norms and the more merciless the evolutionary factors, the more evident it becomes that, so far as man is concerned, his battle is

only a sham battle after all. Now that we have shown that obligation and responsibility cannot serve the pedagogical purpose which Windelband ascribes to them, they become a mockery to life. We look over the universe, and, indeed, we see duty and responsibility as factors in the world-process, but the teleological goal toward which we are moving seems to contain all the life-activity within itself. The whole world seems as if it were being pulled toward that high goal. The struggle is between more and less powerful factors in the process. We feel that in Windelband's view human beings are the tools of factors.

Without the support of any philosophy, one feels the need of a view of the universe by which he may take some part in the struggle, and help toward the attainment of the goal. The popular idea of moral responsibility has some such background as this. We feel that the individual ought to have the means of doing some of the eliminating. We feel that a deterministic world is but one side of the truth.

Although nothing in the previous discussion offer a basis for belief in such a different kind of universe, we may at least feel encouraged

that it is not without the bounds of possibility, if Windelband's theory has been proved inconsistent and untenable.

CONCLUSION

THE course of our discussion has led from the definition of two classes of values, immediate and contributory, and the discovery of their psychological basis in feeling and cognition, to a description of their natural history. First their origin in the earliest stages of consciousness was described. The two types of valuing were held to signify two divergent directions of development of conscious activity. It was emphasized, however, that neither of these ever occurs in isolation from the other, but that, rather, one was more prominent at a given time than the other.

Next the relation of the judgment to values was discussed. In the act itself, it was found that all judgments are contributory. The value of the content of the judgment, however, depends upon the future usefulness of the content. All true judgments were found to be contributory as to content, and also certain false judgments. The comparatively small group of judgments *of value* was treated briefly. It was noted that immediate values first find expression in

the judgment, and that the expression of contributory values grows out of judgments of immediate values. At a subsequent stage of development, however, contributory values become free from previous cognition of the means as immediate values.

Chapter V carried on the natural history of values by discussing their interrelation. This topic concerned the relation of the individual to his environment through the expansion of his interests. The biological point of view was adhered to, and it was discovered that conscious activity is related to environment directly through feeling and cognition. Thereupon it was shown how everything with which conscious activity comes into contact is valuable both from the immediate and from the contributory points of view. Some practical consequences of this fact were deduced.

Early in our discussion (Chapter II), we disposed of a theory which claimed to prove the existence of ontologically objective norms of truth. Part II examined in detail Windelband's theory of norms. The writer believes that he has proved that Windelband's position, in spite of its containing broad and suggestive state-

ments, is self-contradictory, confused in outline, and untenable. It is desirable, in conclusion, to indicate our attitude toward those moral and aesthetic values which are so commonly recognized by human beings.

We must bear in mind that we seek an interpretation that is psychological and biological. All values and standards of value, it is true, inasmuch as they are entities of one kind or another, must have their place in a metaphysical account of the universe. But throughout this book it has been our care to disentangle the psychological and the biological from the metaphysical, and to deal with only the former. In a complete account of values, the metaphysical side must not be neglected, but we have not attempted to give a complete account. Our attack on Windelband's position is not so much an attack on the theory that there *are* ontologically objective norms of thinking, willing, and feeling, as an attack on the attempt to demonstrate the existence of such norms from psychological data.

We have referred to J. S. Mill's description of conscience¹. This description is an excellent

¹ Page 148.

psychological account of the growth of standards of moral value. It runs as follows:

The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same—a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Conscience; though in that complex phenomenon as it actually exists, the simple fact is in general all encrusted over with collateral associations, derived from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling; from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement. . . . Its binding force, however, consists in the existence of a mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right, and which, if we do nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form of remorse. Whatever theory we have of the nature or origin of conscience, this is what essentially constitutes it.

In terms of our theory of values it is evident that any individual act demanded by conscience in view of a standard of morality is related to

consciousness in two ways. First there is the feeling-aspect. Mill well describes how the feeling commonly called "conscience" arises as the consequence of certain inhibitions and associated ideas. While the peculiar character of the feeling of conscience is thus dependent upon the matter to which the feeling is attached, it is no less true that, as one *aspect* of the relation of the individual to the act, the feeling of conscience, like other feelings, is a relation of immediate value. Obedience to the dictate of conscience brings with it a feeling of pleasure; disobedience results in a feeling of the unpleasant. The associated *matter* has not changed feeling to something new and original; it has merely heightened and intensified it.

In the second place, any act the fulfilment of which is demanded by conscience, is related to consciousness also on the cognitive side. Here must be taken into account moral judgment. Any act that is the outcome of a decision in view of some moral standard and is not merely a habitual response prompted by some former decision, involves moral choice and deliberation. Here there is a rivalry among possible courses of action, and some *principle* of action emerges.

Such principles are always judgments *of* values. What A. J. Balfour² calls "subordinate ethical propositions" are judgments of contributory values³. "I ought to make a true statement in this particular instance" may be subordinate to the "fundamental" ethical proposition "I ought to speak the truth." The fundamental proposition, however, is a judgment of immediate value. The word "ought" simply indicates that the feeling of liking is associated with a group of psychological factors in such a way that we name it a feeling of obligation.

Two correlated topics require brief mention. First, the psychological processes involved in the formation of standards do not necessitate our consideration. They are identical with the development of concepts as described in any elementary psychology. Secondly, the point of view that we have adopted in no wise conflicts with the logical account of ethical propositions

² A. J. Balfour, *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, 342.

³ If it be objected that the "subordinate" ethical proposition contains the word "ought" as well as the "fundamental" proposition, and that therefore it too is a judgment of immediate value, let it be remembered that we defined an immediate value as a *given* good, "intrinsic, self-sufficient" (page 8). According to Mr. Balfour's definition of a "subordinate" ethical proposition, the *ought* of such a proposition is not self-sufficient, but ever dependent upon the intrinsic *ought* of its "fundamental" proposition.

given so acutely by Balfour. In reference to the fundamental ethical proposition, we do not have to explain *why* we have such immediate values, any more than we have to explain why there are such entities as value relations at all. It is interesting, however, to observe that *logically*, if certain statements of obligation are *a priori*, so also is there a contributory factor present in every *a priori* statement of obligation. "I ought to speak the truth" means—if it have any meaning at all for any individual—"I ought to say words that are contributory to truth-telling."

There are two principal methods of investigation of aesthetic facts which are pursued by philosophers of aesthetics. One method is satisfied with a wholly empirical, psychological treatment of the facts of appreciation of the beautiful as exhibited in individuals and races. A philosopher who finds his whole interest in this standpoint will be concerned with questions relating to the origin and development of such appreciations. I have already suggested⁴ that natural selection may be a potent factor in the

⁴ Pages 153-154.

determination of what is recognized as beautiful. Among cultured persons, however, the great mass of aesthetic appreciations has lost its survival-reference. Just how far this is true would be a matter for empirical investigation. An empirical inquiry will also be concerned with an investigation of such principles as may be found to underlie the "secondary" systems of later development. Throughout the whole course of an empirical treatment, it should be borne in mind that, psychologically speaking, the aesthetic experience is one of feeling, not of cognition. But an empirical account will pass beyond a mere assignment of experiences to a particular aspect of consciousness, to a consideration of the cognitive elements to which the feeling-experiences are attached. Only on this basis are we justified in introducing such subjects as relation to natural selection, development of aesthetic standards, etc. If an empirical account is to be given, however, let it be wholly empirical, and let care be taken not to allow metaphysical assumptions to creep into the discussion.

On the other hand, quite a different treatment is possible. The aesthetic philosopher may con-

sider the metaphysical significance of the empirical facts of aesthetic appreciation. The psychological investigator need not be hostile to his metaphysical coworker; he would better be his friend. But it should be understood that the two methods are quite separate and distinct. What, then are the principles according to which the aesthetic metaphysician shall proceed?

They are the same as those employed by other metaphysical philosophers. In our day there has been much protest against the cut and dried systems of the older philosophers, and a corresponding satisfaction in everything that pretends to empiricism. I believe, however, that the only justification of this point of view lies in the facts that classical metaphysics had at its disposal fewer scientific facts than are now available, and that it often was willing to neglect such facts as were then known. With a sober view of the known facts, however, it is still a legitimate human impulse to want to transcend the facts in some measure and to ground the contingent in what is permanent. The philosophic impulse of Rickert and Windelband must be recognized as valid and admirable; fault is to be found only with their method—their attempt to deduce metaphysical truths from psychological data.

The problem of a satisfactory and valid method in metaphysical research would seem to resolve itself into the question of how to utilize empirical data without utilizing them wrongly. We may make the following suggestions: Let the metaphysician frankly base his system upon a dogmatism. Let him announce his *faith* in the "real" existence of what he cannot *prove* to exist in the way in which he assumes its existence. Let him work out to the full all the implications that arise from his assumptions. But he should not be content to rest his faith in arbitrary assumptions, even though he must necessarily be arbitrary in the act of assuming. He should look over the body of facts that are known in his particular field. Then let him make bold guesses as to some trans-empirical reference of certain of the facts of observation.

It may be objected that any dogmatic method is a waste of time because it can never reach ascertainable facts. Against the objection it may be urged that, empirically speaking, it is a human impulse to want to transcend the facts, and that, indeed, the roots of all scientific research are embedded in metaphysical assumptions. It is entirely possible, also, that, in the

future, some metaphysical system may be accepted generally as being more comprehensive than any other, in view of all the facts known in every field of human experience. The building of many systems, therefore, would be contributory to the formulation of such an inclusive system. While inclusiveness would not be a guarantee of truth, such a system, nevertheless, might claim the same degree of certainty as that attained in the formulation of laws of nature.

There is, therefore, a wide field of investigation in ethic and aesthetic for the metaphysician to explore. If he be frank and sincere as to the element of dogmatism in his system, there is no reason why he might not attempt to correlate a realm of norms of beauty with a realm of ethical values. Let him, however, not attempt to extend expirical data from psychology and biology into a trans-empirical realm of being, without recognizing the necessity of dogmatism.

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